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1. INTRODUCTION 
A new attitude exists in the United States regarding marriage.! The profound 
social changes2 which have occurred during recent years have caused many 
Americans to change their perceptions of marriage. Fewer people are now 
marrying,3 as cohabitation without marriage has become increasingly popular 
and acceptable. 4 Couples are also waiting until they are older before they marry.5 
In addition to these statistics, the divorce rate has risen steadily to a record high. 6 
I. See generally Clark, The New Marriage, 12 WILLAMETTE L. J. 441 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Clark, 
The New Marriage]; Glendon, Modern Marriage Law and Its Underlying Assumptions: The New Marriage and 
the New Property, 13 FAM. L. Q. 441 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Glendon, Modern Marriage Law]; 
Weyrauch, Metamorphoses of Marriage, 13 FAM. L. Q. 415 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Weyrauch]. 
2. Clark, The New Marriage, supra note 1, at 442-43. Clark notes particularly the reduction in the 
marriage rate, the increase in alternatives to marriage, the decrease in sexual stereotypes and a change in 
the function of marriage itself. Weyrauch, supra note 1, at 418-25. Weyrauch notes the increase in 
equality between spouses, the increase in marital contracts, the trend to recognize the economics of 
marriage and the increase in informal marriage. Id. Glendon, Modern Marriage Law, supra note 1, at 
444-46. Glendon notes the increase in informal marriage, the ease of divorce, neutrality toward 
lifestyles and new assumptions regarding equality and individual autonomy. Id. 
3. Clark, The New Marriage, supra note 1, at 442. According to the Statistical Abstract of the United 
States, the marriage rate for 1970 was 10.6 per 1000 population while the rate for 1976 was 10.0 per 
1000 population. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 83 (101st ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. For a detailed analysis of 
marriage rates of this century, see H. CARTER & P. GLICK, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE: A SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC STUDY (1976) [hereinafter cited as CARTER & GLICK]' 
4. Clark, The New Marriage, supra note 1, at 443; S. KATZ & W. WEYRAUCH, AMERICAN FAMILY LAW IN 
TRANSITION 1 (1981) [hereinafter cited as KATZ & WEYRAUCH]; Weyrauch, supra note 1, at 425. 
Weyrauch estimates "substantially" more than eight million people cohabitate without marriage in the 
United States. Id. at 425 n.26. See Glick, A Demographer Looks at American Families, in THE FAMILY IN 
TRANSITION - RETHINKING MARRIAGE, SEXUALITY, CHILD REARING AND FAMILY ORGANIZATION (2d ed. 
1977); Glendon,Marriage and the State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REv. 663 (1976); Kay & 
Amyz, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CAL. L. REv. 937 (1977). 
5. Clark, The New Marriage, supra note 1, at 442 n.16; STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 3, at 67; 
1890-1970: U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES: COLONIAL 
TIMES TO 1970, at 20-21 (1975). In 1960, among men ages 20-24, 53% had never been married; by 
1978, the percent that had never been married had risen to 66%. Among women, ages 20-24, the 
percent that had never been married was 28% in 1960 and 48% in 1978. G. MASNICK & M. J. BANE, THE 
NATION'S FAMILIES, 1960-1990, at 149 (1980). 
6. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT,supra note 3, at 67 (in 1950, the divorce rate was 2.6 per 1000 population; 
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The law has kept pace with these changing perceptions of marriage. 7 Amer-
ican family law has responded dramatically with new treatment of informal 
marriage,8 increased recognition of the economic aspects of marriage,9 and a 
growing respect for personal privacy and autonomy of individuals.!O Divorce has 
become more readily obtainable;!! no fault divorce is now the dominant method 
of divorce in the United States. 12 In response to the changing attitudes toward 
marriage and divorce, courts have sanctioned new devices to deal with the 
termination of marital relationships.! 3 These devices include express or implied 
contracts of cohabitation,!4 partnership,!5 quasi-contractual arrangements! 6 and 
In 1960, the rate was 2.2 per 1000 population; in 1970, the rate was 3.5 per 1000 population; and in 
1979 the rate was 5.3 per 1000 population - which exceeded the highest divorce rate ever before 
recorded in the United States, which was 4.3 per 1000 population in 1946). See CARTER & GLICK,supra 
note 3, at 394; Blakesley, Child Custody and Parental Authority in France, Louisiana and Other States of the 
United States: A Comparative Analysis, 4 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 283 (1981). Blakesley notes a 
disturbing by-product of the increase in marital break-ups, namely, the problem of child custody. 
One observer of this trend suggests that emotional detachment may now be desirable in marriage. 
Weyrauch, supra note I, at 424. As evidence to support his viewpoint Weyrauch notes the increase in the 
importance of individual autonomy, separate bookkeeping, sexual tolerance and the increasing equality 
between the sexes. [d. 
7. Weyrauch, supra note I, at 417. Weyrauch stresses that marriage is increasingly governed by 
contract notions. In addition, he notes the trend of marriage as co-ownership for profit, with attendant 
mutual support obligations. [d. at 418-22. Glendon,Modern Marriage Law, supra note I, at 444. Glendon 
emphasizes the greater regulation of economic aspects of marriage, in contrast to regulation of 
marriage formation and dissolution. Her thesis is that the family has become legally less important as 
work and government entitlements have increased in importance. [d. at 456. She notes "the decline of 
marriage as a support institution and the decline of the family as a status determinant." [d. at 447. 
8. Weyrauch, supra note I, at 428-32. Weyrauch suggests that an express agreement, enforced by the 
courts, may take the place of "formal statutory marriage." /d. at 428. 
9. [d. at 421. 
10. Clark, The New Marriage, supra note I, at 446; Weyrauch, supra note I, at 418. 
II. Glendon, Modern Marriage Law, supra note I, at 444. Glendon refers to the fact that divorce has 
become a "normal" mode of marriage termination. [d. Clark, The New Marriage, supra note I, at 444. 
Indeed, Clark observes that permanence is no longer part of the legal definition of marriage. /d. 
12. UNIFORM MARITAL PROP. ACT at ii (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws, Discussion Draft 1981) [hereinafter cited as UMPAj. By 1981, only Illinois and South Dakota 
retained fault-based divorce. [d. No fault divorce is a type of divorce in which a marriage can be ended 
on an allegation that the marriage is irretrievably broken or there are irreconcilable differences. Fault 
need not be shown or proven. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 945 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). See also UNIFORM 
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT (UMDA), §§ 302, 305; Clark, The New Marriage, supra note I, at 444. 
13. Weyrauch, supra note I, at 427. 
14. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 ,Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976), finding 
cohabitation contracts enforceable, whether express or implied. 
We conclude that the judicial barriers that may stand in the way of a policy based upon the 
fulfillment of the reasonable expectations of the parties to a non marital relationship should be 
removed. As we have explained, the courts now hold that express agreements will be enforced 
unless they rest on an unlawful meretricious consideration. We add that in the absence of an 
express agreement, the courts may look to a variety of other remedies in order to protect the 
parties' lawful expectations. 
[d. See also Glasco V. Glasco, 410 N.E.2d 1325 (Ind. App. 1980) (express contract); Kozlowski V. 
Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 902 (1979) (express contract); McCullon V. McCullon, 96 Misc. 2d 962, 
410 N.Y.S.2d 226 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (implied contract). See generally Kay & Amyz, Marvin V. Marvin: 
Preseruing the Options, 65 CAL. L. REV. 937 (1977); Levin & Spak,judicial Enforcement of Cohabitation 
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resulting17 and constructive trusts. 18 
The changes in the social patterns and perceptions of marriage demonstrate 
that marriage is no longer the only desirable and acceptable lifestyle for many 
couples.19 Because of the availability of alternative lifestyles, couples tend to 
consider the social, economic and legal aspects of marriage more carefully 
before entering into the marital relationship.20 One manifestation of this new 
attitude is the use of marital contracts, both antenuptiaJ21 and postnuptial.22 
Agreements: A Signal To Purge Marriage From the Statute of Frauds, 12 CREIGHTON L. REv. 499 (1978); Note, 
Property Rights of Nonmarital Partners in Meretricious Cohabitation, 13 NEW ENG. L. REv. 453 (1978). 
15. See, e.g., Eggleston v. Eggleston, 228 N.C. 668, 47 S.E. 2d 243 (1948), finding a valid partnership 
between spouses when both worked in the family trucking business; and Steinhauer v. Steinhauer, 252 
So. 2d 825 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), finding a partnership when the husband assisted the wife in her 
interior design business; and Poole v. Schrichte, 39 Wash. 2d 558, 236 P.2d 1044 (1951). See generally 
Folberg & Buren, Domestic Partnership: A Proposal for Dividing The Property of Unmarried Families, 12 
WILLAMETTE L. J. 453 (1976). 
16. See, e.g., Sanguinetti v. Sanguinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 69 P.2d 845 (1937), finding the putative wife was 
entitled to compensation for the amount her services exceeded the value of the maintenance provided 
her; and Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal. App. 2d 708, 200 P.2d 49 (1948), finding a putative wife 
was entitled to compensation for the value of her services rendered and for money she had contributed 
to the household expenses. 
17. See, e.g., Hyman v. Hyman, 275 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), in which the court found a 
resulting trust in favor of a putative wife, based on the provisions of a marital contract governing 
property accumulated jointly. See also Walberg v. Mattson, 38 Wash. 2d 808, 232 P.2d 827 (1951); 
Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wash. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948). 
18. See, e.g., Orner v. Orner, 11 Wash. App. 386,523 P.2d 957 (1974), finding a constructive trust 
because the former husband was unjustly enriched because he held sole title to property acquired 
through joint efforts; Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wash. 2d 376, 407 P.2d 967 (1965). 
19. Weyrauch, supra note 1, at 424. Cohabitation without marriage is increasingly common. [d. at 
424-25. See note 4 supra. Indeed, the law favors cohabitation to some degree. Such favoritism is the 
result of the lack of legal duties arising from cohabiting relationships, in contrast to the many legal 
implications, most particularly support obligations, arising from marriage. However, this favored 
position may be changing. Weyrauch, supra note 1, at 426. Now, non-marital relationships are increas-
ingly having marriage-like consequences. Clark, The New Marriage, supra note 1, at 449. Weyrauch 
notes: 
If one behaves as if he is married, he is often treated as if he were married. If one behaves as if 
he is not married, he is nevertheless often treated as if he were married. In effect this means 
that a marriage or at least some of its consequences, may be imposed on the parties if the 
circumstances, as seen by the courts, warrant it. 
Weyrauch, supra note 1, at 426. By way of example, Weyrauch cites a Florida case in which a court 
imposed a common law marriage in an "almost punitive way" upon the recalcitrant "husband." 
Chaachou v. Chaachou, 135 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1961). 
20. Clark, The New Marriage, supra note 1, at 442. Some authors have concluded that the recognition 
of female equality has led to wariness of marriage among women. They note that many women are 
fearful that marriage will become a tool for their repression. [d. at 442 nn.12, 13. See generally, 
L. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSES, LoVERS, AND THE LAw (1981). 
21. Antenuptial or postnuptial contracts are made between prospective spouses and spouses, respec-
tively. See generally A. LINDEY, ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS AND MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS (1979) [here-
inafter cited as LINDEY]; Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, 50 CoLO. L. REv. 141 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 
Clark, Antenuptial Contracts]; Branca & Steinberg, Antenuptial Agreements Under California Law, 11 
U.S.F.L. REv. 317 (1977); Cathey, Ante-Nuptial Agreements in Arkansas -A Drafter's Problem, 24 ARK. L. 
REV. 275 (1970); Gamble, The Antenuptial Contract, 26 U. MIAMI L. REv. 692 (1972). 
Antenuptial agreements generally determine property rights between the spouses. LIN DEY, supra, at 
90-26. The recent trend has been to allow spouses to determine rights upon divorce, in addition to 
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These contracts can serve as mechanisms for legalizing a couple's perceptions of 
their marital rights and duties23 and for insuring fulfillment of their carefully 
considered expectations.24 A couple undertakes the formalities25 of a marital 
contract as a way of safeguarding its marital assumptions in the face of the 
uncertainties of the future. 26 
A new use for marital contracts has developed as a result of changing social 
patterns. Traditionally, courts have held that marital contracts contemplating 
divorce violated public policy because such contracts were said to encourage 
divorce. 27 However, courts now increasingly permit marital contracts which estab-
lish couples' rights upon divorce. 28 This dramatic reversal by the courts has 
expanded the permissible scope of marital contracts. Nevertheless, courts have 
survivor's rights. Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, supra, at 149-50; Weyrauch, supra note 1, at 419. See note 
28 infra. For sample contracts, see A. LIN DEY , 1,2, SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CON-
TRACTS (1978). 
22. Postnuptial contracts are contracts made after marriage having provisions similar to antenuptial 
contracts. Clark notes that postnuptial and antenuptial contracts are governed by similar principles and 
that such contracts generally receive favorable treatment by the courts. Clark,Antenuptial Contracts, supra 
note 21, at 141 n.1. See, e.g., Rockwell v. Rockwell, 24 Mich. App. 593,180 N.W.2d 498 (1970). For the 
purposes of this Comment, "postnuptial contracts" are those marital contracts which are made after 
marriage, but not in immediate contemplation of either separation or divorce. Separation contracts are 
governed by different rules. Branca & Steinberg, Antenuptial Agreements Under California Law, II 
U.S.F.L. REV. 317 (1977).See LINDEY,supra note 21, for an exhaustive treatment of separation contracts. 
Throughout this Comment "marital contracts" will refer to both antenuptial and postnuptial con-
tracts. 
23. Weyrauch, supra note 1, at 419-20. 
24. Clark, Anten;ptial Contracts, supra note 21. at 163. Weyrauch, supra note 1, at 420. Weyrauch 
states: 
!d. 
The relationship contemplated by the parties to modern forms of antenuptial agreements is 
not dissimilar to other long-term contracts of indefinite duration, such as partnership or 
cotenancy, sometimes employment. Since the parties to a possible future marriage deal with 
each other on an assumed level of equality and equal bargaining power, their agreement, if it 
leads to marriage at all, tends to reflect their financial and personal expectations, as for 
instance, choice of career and domicile, and how many children to have, if any, sexual and 
recreational preferences. 
25. Several writers have noted a social stigma against marital contracts. Neely, Marriage Contracts, For 
Better Or For Worse, in MARITAL AND NON-MARITAL CONTRACTS: PREVENTIVE LAw FOR THE FAMILY 9 
O. Krauskopf ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Neely]; R. BURGER, THE LoVE CONTRACT: HANDBOOK FOR 
A LIBERATED MARRIAGE 2 (1972) [hereinafter cited as BURGER]. 
26. Neely, supra note 25, at 9. "It would appear ... that the prenuptial contract could accomplish a 
great deal in protecting everyone from the vacillations of the domestic-relations law caused by changing 
morals and social structures." !d. 
27. Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, supra note 21, at 148; LINDEY,supra note 21, at 33. See Eule v. Eule, 24 
Ill. App.3d 83, 320 N.E.2d 506 (1974); Ranney v. Ranney, 219 Kan. 428, 548 P.2d 734 (1976); Holliday 
v. Holliday, 358 So. 2d 618 (La. 1978); Connoly v. Connoly, 270 N.W. 2d 44 (S.D. 1978). 
28. LINDEY, supra note 21, at 90-35; Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, supra note 21, at 149-50. See In re 
Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 551 P.2d 323,131 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1976); Parniawski v. Parniawski, 33 
Conn. Supp. 44, 359 A.2d 719 (1976); Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970); Tomlinson v. 
Tomlinson, 170 Ind. App. 331, 352 N.E.2d 785 (1976); Buettner v. Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600 
(1973); Freeman v. Freeman, 565 P.2d 365 (Okla. 1977). 
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failed to treat marital contracts like other contracts.29 This Comment demon-
strates that the widespread assumption that marital contracts, like other con-
tracts, will be enforced as written is highly suspect.30 What appears to be a viable 
system of contracting out of otherwise applicable rights and duties is really a 
system subject to broad judicial discretion.3! 
After examining U.S. courts' treatment of marital contracts, the author com-
pares the manner in which the courts in Great Britain deal with marital contracts 
or "settlements."32 As in the United States, the enforceability of marital contracts 
in Great Britain is largely a function of the court's discretion. 33 However, in 
contrast to U.S. law, British law explicitly states that courts have the power to 
vary antenuptial or postnuptial settlements after the termination of the mar-
riage34 or after the death of one spouse.35 
Finally, this Comment suggests an alternative model for marital contracts in 
the United States, based on the civil law systems of France and Quebec. Those 
systems enforce marital contracts as written after the parties have complied with 
procedural requirements, including contract execution by a notary.36 The au-
thor recommends that courts modify their approach in favor of the civil law 
system and adopt a more protective posture with respect to a couple's contractu-
ally stated intent. Thus, the author suggests use of an attestation procedure for 
marital contracts to provide a preliminary establishment of validity. Further, the 
author advocates the use of a disinterested third party, similar to the civil law 
notary, in the execution of marital contracts. Such procedural devices would 
insure voluntariness and fairness in the United States, while providing sig-
nificant contractual freedom. 
29. M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 67 n.60 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 
GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY]. See also § III infra. 
30. See, e.g., Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); In re Estate of Grassman, 
183 Neb. 147, 158 N.W.2d 673 (1968); Bauer v. Bauer, lOr. App. 504, 464 P.2d 710 (1970); Norris and 
Norris, 51 Or. App. 43, 624 P.2d 636 (1981); Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash. 2d 293, 494 P.2d 
208 (1972). 
31. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) notes this explicitly; Section 307(A) of the 
UMDA directs the court to consider any antenuptial agreement between the parties as merely one 
factor in dividing property incident to divorce. Thus, judicial discretion often prevents couples from 
determining their own rights regarding their property. 
32. See P. BROMLEY, FAMILY LAw 538-39 (1976) [hereinafter cited as BROMLEY]. 
33. RAy DEN'S LAw AND PRACTICE IN DIVORCE AND FAMILY LAw MATTERS IN ALL COURTS 790 
U. Jackson ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as RAYDEN'S]. 
34. MATRIMONIAL CAUSES ACT, 1973, ch. 18, § 24(l)(c); RAYDEN'S, supra note 33, at 790. 
35. Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) Act, 1975, ch. 63, § 2 [hereinafter cited as 
Inheritance Act]; O. STONE, FAMILY LAw 161-64 (1977) [hereinafter cited as STONE]. 
36. France: CoDE CIVIL (C. CIV.) art. 1394; Quebec: C. CIV. art. 1264; Rheinstein & Glendon, 
Interspousal Relations, in PERSONS AND FAMILY, IV INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAw 
149 (A. Chloros ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Interspousal Relations]. 
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II. THE TREATMENT OF MARITAL CONTRACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Marital contracts were at one time exclusively a tool of the rich. 37 However, 
with the change in attitudes regarding marriage, marital contracts have come to 
serve couples from varying economic spheres. 38 This increased use of marital 
contracts over the past few decades has been significant. 39 American couples are 
becoming more interested in exercising the full extent of their contractual 
freedom when making the commitment of marriage. 40 
A. ThR Perception l?f Marital Contracts as Enforceable 
Because marital contracts are now increasingly enforceable,41 couples assume 
their marital contracts will be enforced. 42 As a result of this perception, prospec-
tive spouses are increasingly turning to marital contracts. 43 A couple's expecta-
tion that a court will enforce their carefully drafted agreement is reasonable, 
especially in light of the fact that many couples engage in legal formalities, such 
37. KATZ & WEYRAUCH,supra note 4, at 1; Neely, supra note 25, at 9; Weyrauch, supra note I, at 419. 
38. Neely, supra note 25, at 9; Weyrauch, supra note I, at 419. 
39. Weyrauch, supra note I, at 419; J. McLEOD & G. BAKER, CONTRACTS IN THE FAMILY 16 (1979) 
[hereinafter cited as MCLEOD & BAKER]. This Comment discusses only the typical financial marital 
contracts. Some marital contracts seek to regulate such personal activities as domestic duties and sexual 
rights. See generaUy Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CAL. L. REv. 1169 
(1974); Krauskopf & Thomas, Partnership Marriage: The Solution To An Ineffective and Inequitable Law of 
Support, 35 OHIO ST. L. J. 558 (1974); Note,Marriage Contracts For Support and Services: Constitutionality 
Begins at Home, 49 N. Y. U. L. REv. 1161 (1974). 
40. Several authors have responded to this heightened demand for information by writing instruc-
tional books for lay people. See P. ASHLEY, OH PROMISE ME BUT PuT IT IN WRITING (1979) [hereinafter 
cited as ASHLEY]; and BURGER, supra note 25. Clark notes that because of recent social change, 
antenuptial agreements are serving new functions and achieving new importance. Clark, Antenuptial 
Contracts, supra note 21, at 164. 
41. See note 28 and accompanying text supra. 
42. See ASHLEY, supra note 40; BURGER, supra note 25. Both authors urge couples to use these 
valuable contracts. 
43. Interspousal Relations, supra note 36, at 156; Weyrauch, supra note I, at 419. The new interest in 
marital contracts is shown by the growing literature in this field. See, e.g., Bartke, Marital Sharing - Why 
Not Do It I!y Contractr 67 GEO. L. J. 1131 (1979); Gamble, The Antenuptial Contract, 26 U. MIAMI L. REv. 
692 (1974); King & Firestone, Antenuptial Contract: A Useful Alternative, 4 U. SAN FERNANDO VALLEY L. 
REv. 249 (1975); Note, The Antenuptial ContTact in Ohio, 28 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1040 (1978); Note, 
Louisiana's Forbidden Antenuptial Waiver of Alimony Pendente Lite, 39 LA. L. REv. 1161 (1979); Note, 
Interspousal Contracts: The Potential For Validation in Massachusetts, 9 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 185 (1974); Note, 
Antenuptial and Postnuptial Contracts in Washington, 54 WASH. L. REv. 135 (1978). This increase in marital 
contracts may be shown by an informal survey of the Decennial Digests. Under the section Validity in 
General of antenuptial contracts, there were the following number of cases reported: 46 cases in 
1946-1956, 45 cases in 1956-1966, 74 cases in 1966-1976, and 50 cases in 1976-1981. Thus, spouses 
increasingly litigate marital contracts. 
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as the use of lawyers,44 negotiations,45 form contracts46 and a formal signing 
ceremony.47 Such formalities are unnecessary if couples merely seek to define 
their marital roles in an informal, non-binding manner. However, couples be-
lieve that the legal formalities assure enforcement of their contract. 48 
Another manifestation of the belief that marital contracts are enforced as 
written is evidenced by the use of the contracts as protection in the event of 
divorce. 49 When two individuals terminate their marriage, they must divide their 
property. Although there are a variety of systems for property division upon 
divorce, the predominant method in the absence of a contract is through judicial 
discretion.50 Under this approach, ajudge distributes a couple's marital property 
in whatever manner the judge considers to be just and equitable. 51 Therefore, 
couples risk forfeiting control over their property to the courtS.52 As a counter-
balance to this broad judicial power, couples rely on the validity of their marital 
contracts to protect themselves from the unpredictability of the present property 
division system.53 
44. E.g., Barnhill v. Barnhill, 386 So. 2d 749 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980); Hartz v. Hartz, 248 Md. 47, 234 
A.2d 865 (1967); Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102,506 P.2d 719 (1973). 
45. E.g., Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W. 2d 
782 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102,506 P.2d 719 (1973). 
46. See ASHLEY, supra note 40; BURGER, supra note 25. For a treatise that provides sample forms, see 
A. LINDEY, 1,2 SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS (1978). 
47. E.g., Rocker v. Rocker, 13 Ohio Mise. 199,203,232 N.E. 2d 445, 449 (1967). In this case the 
parties signed the contract in duplicate before two witnesses, one of whom was a court clerk. Id. A 
notary acknowledged the signatures at the court ceremony. Id. 
48. Clark, The New Marriage, supra note I, at 451. 
49. See notes 52-53 and accompanying text infra. 
50. Glendon, Modem Marriage Law, supra note I, at 445. Judge Neely explains the necessity of 
flexibility because of the infinite variety of possible fact situations. Neely, supra note 25, at 7-8. See 
M. WHEELER, No-FAULT DIVORCE (1974); Freed & Foster, Divorce in the 50 States: An Overoiew As of 1978, 
in 13 FAM. L. Q. 105 (1979). 
51. Glendon, Modem Marriage Law, supra note I, at 445 n.18, citing Interspousal Relations, supra note 
36. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 208, § 34 (West Supp. 1982-1983), which provides: 
Id. 
Upon divorce or upon motion in an action brought at any time after a divorce, the court may 
make a judgment for either of the parties to pay alimony to the other. In addition to or in lieu 
of ajudgment to pay alimony, the court may assign to either husband or wife all or any part of 
the estate of the other. In determining the amount of alimony, if any, to be paid, or in fixing 
the nature and value of the property, if any, to be so assigned, the court, after hearing the 
witnesses, if any, of each party, shall consider the length of the marriage, the conduct of the 
parties during the marriage, the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of 
income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties and 
the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital assets and income. The court may also 
consider the contribution of each of the parties in the acquisition, preservation or appreciation 
in value of their respective estates and the contribution of each of the parties as a homemaker 
to the family unit. 
52. Neely, supra note 25, at 7. Judge Neely states: 
The only general rule places m?st of the crucial decisions regarding litigated domestic-rela-
tions matters within the discretion of the trial judge. Consequently any man who marries is 
placing all his worldly goods, the welfare of his future children, and all his future income for so 
long as his wife shall live into the hands of a semiliterate trial judge. 
53. MARITAL AND NON-MARITAL CONTRACTS: PREVENTIVE LAw FOR THE FAMILY 1 (J. Krauskopf ed. 
1979). Krauskopf notes: 
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The belief that marital contracts are useful and enfO'rced by the courts is alsO' 
held by the drafters54 O'f the UnifO'rm Marital PrO'perty Act,55 whO' based the 
prO'visiO'ns O'f the Act O'n the premise that courts generally enforce marital 
contracts.56 The Act, which proposes to "identify and rectify problems in the 
economic area O'f marriage,"57 offers several innovative concepts in its proposal 
for a uniform marital prO'perty system.58 Among these new cO'ncepts are the 
nO'tions that: (1) all property that a couple acquires during marriage is marital 
property;59 (2) marital prO'perty should be divided equally between the spouses 
upon dissolution of the marriage by a strO'ng presumption;60 and (3) marital 
property should be divided equally between the surviving spouse and the dece-
dent spouse's estate.61 The Act emphasizes that, under its provisions, spouses 
have the option to contract O'n their own to avoid operation of the Act.62 Indeed, 
the Act's preface speaks apprO'vingly of individual "custom systems" which 
couples may use to' tailor their agreements to their circumstances and expecta-
tions.63 
SectiO'n 13 of the proposed Act64 specifically prO'vides that spouses may make 
marital property agreements at variance with otherwise applicable state laws O'f 
ld. 
Unstated by the courts is the primary impetus for the startling increase in the desire to utilize 
antenuptial contracts effective at marriage dissolution: the newly broadened discretionary 
power of courts to divide property equitably at divorce. The uncertainty concerning future 
manner of division and the relative impossibility of challenging divisions as abuse of discretion 
impel attorneys to counsel clients to consider entering antenuptial contracts. 
54. The cited tentative draft of the Act is the work of the Drafting Committee of the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The Commissioners represent all U.S.jurisdic-
tions. The cited draft is one of several drafts written by the Drafting Committee. The National 
Conference of Commissioners first considered the final draft in Summer 1982. The Act must go 
through three annual readings of the Commissioners before it becomes sanctioned by the National 
Conference of Commissioners. At that point, if the Commissioners decide to seek approval as a Model 
Act, then the Model Act will go to the states to be passed on individually. However, before the Model 
Act goes to the states for their approval, the American Bar Association must pass the Uniform Act. 
Thus. the Act is several years away from state passage. 
55. UMPA. supra note 12. The purpose of the Marital Property Act is to establish a new system of 
economic relations during marriage. at marriage dissolution and at the death of a spouse. The new 
system will attempt to correlate economic relations during the marriage with the economic relations 
created if the couple divorces.ld. at iv. Such a new system of marital sharing is called for by the high 
incidence of two-worker families and the increase in the divorce rate. ld. at iv-v. 
56. See UMPA. supra note 12. at 27. The Act presumes the validity of marital contracts in its several 
provisions allowing parties to "contract out" of the Act as desired. Section 13 of the Act provides: 
"Spouses may make one or more marital property agreements in which they agree to: ... classification 
of any of their property at variance with this Act." But if. note 31 supra and note 74 infra. 
57. UMPA. supra note 12. at vi. 
58. ld. at vi-x. 
59. ld. at vi. 
60. ld. at vii. 
61. ld. 
62. ld. at 27. 
63. ld. at vii. 
64. !d. at 27. 
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property succession65 and create any mutually agreeable system for managing 
and controlling their property.66 Moreover, the Act provides that upon marital 
termination the court shall divide marital property according to the Act's provi-
sions "unless the spouses have otherwise agreed in a marital property agree-
ment."67 This provision demonstrates that the lawyers who drafted the Act pre-
sumed the availability of antenuptial and postnuptial contracts as a legally viable 
alternative to property succession statutes. This perception is quite problematic, 
as a close examination of relevant cases demonstrates. 68 
B. The Distinction Between Marital Contracts and Ordinary Contracts 
Despite the fact that marital contracts are theoretically valid and enforceable,69 
in practice courts do not treat such contracts like ordinary contracts. 70 In fact, 
courts do not even treat marital contracts as they treat contracts between persons 
in other confidential relationships, such as the attorney-client relationship. 71 
Instead, courts routinely disregard marital contracts,72 treating them as merely 
65. Id. 
66. !d. at 28. 
67. !d. at 34. 
68. The writings of two prominent family law scholars, Homer Clark and Walter Weyrauch, similarly 
do not discuss the reluctance of courts to enforce marital contracts. Their works may, as a consequence, 
fail to provide a comprehensive analysis of the situation. See Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, supra note 21; 
Clark, The New Marriage, supra note 1; H. CLARK, CASES AND PROBLEMS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1974); 
Weyrauch, supra note 1; WEYRAUCH & KATZ, supra note 4. 
69. See notes 27 and 28 and accompanying text supra. 
70. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY, supra note 29, at 67 n.60. Glendon notes this trend in the law, 
speaking of "the existing uncertainty about the extent to which antenuptial contracts will be enforced." 
Id. Glendon notes duress and a presumption of concealment as two illustrations of the recent invalida-
tion of marital contracts. For a discussion of these rationales, see notes 141-45 and 154-70 and 
accompanying text infra. 
A recent law review note gives a statistical breakdown of the validity of marital contracts. Note, 
Antenuptial arul Postnuptial Contracts in Washington, 54 WASH. L. REv. 135 (1978). Washington courts 
invalidated seven of the thirteen relevant marital contracts litigated in Washington 1900-1978.!d. 
As discussed in § H.C.l infra, courts uphold marital contracts if they are fair in their financial 
provisions. Only when a contract is substantively unfair will the court question its validity. LINDEY,supra 
note 21, at 90-52. 
The following cases have held marital contracts void based on a finding of inadequate disclosure: 
Allison v. Stevens, 269 Ala. 288, 112 So. 2d 451 (1959); In re Estate of Harber, 104 Ariz. 79, 449 P.2d 7 
(1969); Arnold v. Arnold, 261 Ark. 734,553 S.W.2d 251 (1977); Plant v. Plant, 320 So. 2d 455 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1975); Norris and Norris, 51 Or. App. 43, 624 P.2d 636 (1981); Kosik v. George, 253 Or. 15, 
452 P.2d 560 (1969); and Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash. 2d 293,494 P.2d 208 (1972). 
Cases in which courts have struck down marital contracts on a finding of duress or coercion include: 
In re Estate of Harber, 104 Ariz. 79, 449 P.2d 7 (1969); In re Sayegh's Estate, 118 Cal. App. 2d 327, 257 
P.2d 995 (1953); Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Plant v. Plant, 320 So. 2d 
455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Blaising v. Mills, 374 N.E.2d 1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978); In re Estate of 
Grassman, 183 Neb. 147, 158 N.W.2d 673 (1968); Norris and Norris, 51 Or. App. 43, 624 P.2d 636 
(1981); and Bauer v. Bauer, lOr. App. 504, 464 P.2d 710 (1970). 
71. A. CoRBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRACTS §§ 1456, 1457 (1962). 
72. See note 70 supra. 
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one factor among several to be considered in deciding what is fair between the 
parties. 73 The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act codifies this posture explicitly; 
section 307(a) of the Act directs the court to consider an antenuptial contract 
between the parties as merely one factor in dividing property incident to di-
vorce. 74 
The high degree of judicial discretion which courts exercise with respect to 
property settlement at divorce 75 seems to have influenced the treatment of 
marital contracts. 76 Judges apparently feel that they should be able to construe 
marital contracts with as much discretion as they have with respect to separation 
agreements and property division. 77 This reasoning serves as justification for the 
close judicial scrutiny afforded marital contracts. 
The major factor which distinguishes marital contracts from ordinary con-
tracts, and provides judges with an opportunity to exercise their discretion is the 
lack of arm's length dealings in marital contracts. 78 Whether the parties are 
contemplating marriage or are already married when they make their contract, 
they are in a relationship of mutual confidence that requires good faith, candor 
and sincerity regarding the marital contract. 79 Scholars reason that a confidential 
73. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Thompson, 39 Colo. App. 400, 568 P.2d 98 (1977); Ferry v. Ferry, 586 
S.W.2d 782 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash. 2d 293, 494 P.2d 208 (1972). See 
also § II.B & C supra. 
Id. 
74. UMDA § 307(a). The Act provides: 
In making apportionment the court shall consider the duration of the marriage, and prior 
marriage of either party, antenuptial agreement of the parties, the age, health, station, 
occupation, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, 
and needs of each of the parties, custodial provisions, whether the apportionment is in lieu of 
or in addition to maintenance, and the opportunity of each for future acquisition of capital 
assets and income. 
75. See notes 50 and 51 and accompanying text supra. 
76. Neely, supra note 25, at 9. Neely observes that judges today have a "Iess-than-healthy regard" for 
the inviolability of marital contracts. Id. Weitzman notes the extensive judicial discretion regarding 
marital contracts; observing that the family law standards of adequacy and fairness allow broad latitude 
for judges. L. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT: SPOUSE, LoVERS, AND THE LAw 355 (1981) 
[hereinafter cited as WEITZMAN]. 
77. See Neely, supra note 25, at 9. As discussed in notes 49 and 50, the usual method of property 
division upon divorce is by equitable distribution. Similarly, judges have broad discretion regarding the 
enforcement of separation agreements. LIN DEY ,supra note 21, at 3-4. 
78. LINDEY, supra note 21, at 90-47. See also Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111, 1115 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1976). Weitzman notes that courts use potential abuse as justification for invalidation. WEITZMAN, 
supra note 76, at 344. 
79. LINDEY, supra note 21, at 90-47. This statement is also part of "the general rule." Id. See, e.g., 
Blaising v. Mills, 374 N.E.2d 1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978); Merrill v. Estate of Merrill, 275 Or. 653, 552 
P.2d 249 (1976); and Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash. 2d 293, 494 P.2d 208 (1972). Some courts 
refer to a confidential relationship. See, e.g., Blaising v. Mills, 374 N.E.2d 1166, 1170 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1978); Hartz v. Hartz, 248 Md. 47, 52, 234A.2d 865, 870 (1967); Wilson v. Wilson, 354 S.W.2d 532, 546 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1962); In re Estate of Strickland, 181 Neb. 478, 486,149 N.W.2d 344, 352 (1967); Rocker 
v. Rocker, 13 Ohio Misc. 199,206,232 N.E.2d 445, 452 (1967); Peste v. Peste, 1 Wash. App. 19,23,459 
P.2d 70, 74 (1969). Clark notes: "Many courts take the view that the prospective spouses are in a 
confidential relationship, and this seems clearly correct." Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, supra note 21, at 
144. 
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relationship provides a greater opportunity for fraud than does the typical 
commercial, or arm's length relationship.80 Inherent risks exist in the forma-
tion of marital contracts when two people, who are in positions of trust, have 
very different legal and business experience.8! Courts have responded to the 
possibility of abuse of a confidential relationship by closely scrutinizing marital 
contracts. 82 
Traditionally, the state controlled the marriage relation and all its incidents. 83 
The rationale for extensive state regulation was the importance of preserving the 
traditional family. 84 The state set rigid obligations on the parties to achieve this 
end, such as the husband's responsibility for support and the wife's domestic 
responsibility.85 Some courts even characterized marriage as a union between the 
husband, the wife and the state. 86 Ample precedent exists for intervention in the 
marital relation. 87 Further, the state has an interest in ensuring that property 
settlements adequately provide for the parties so they will not become public 
charges. 88 
Other courts refer to a fiduciary duty between the parties. See, e.g., Norris and Norris, 51 Or. App. 43, 
46,624 P.2d 636,639 (1981); Bauer v. Bauer, lOr. App. 504, 505, 464 P.2d 710, 711 (1970); Kosik v. 
George, 253 Or. 15, 18,452 P.2d 560, 563 (1969). 
80. Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, supra note 21, at 144; WEITZMAN, supra note 76, at 344. 
81. Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, supra note 21, at 144. Clark notes that often the prospective spouses 
are not equally knowledgeable about each others' financial position. !d. 
82. WEITZMAN, supra note 76, at 344; LINDEY, supra note 21, at 8-3. Lindey notes that marriage is a 
unique civil contract which society controls strictly. !d. 
83. Glendon,Modern Marriage Law, supra note I, at 443. Glendon notes the underlying assumption in 
tum of the century marriage law that "state regulation of [marriage) formation, organization and 
dissolution was proper." !d. Clark observes the historical principle that marriage and all its incidents 
were subject to state control. Clark, The New Marriage, supra note I, at 442, citing Maynard v. Hill, 125 
U.S. 190 (1888). 
Howeyer, times are changing. Glendon notes "state regulation of the formation and dissolution of 
marriage [is) reduced, while regulation of the economic and child-related effects of marriage, ... [is) 
expanded." Glendon, Modern Marriage Law, supra note 1, at 444, citing M. GLENDON, STATE, LAw AND 
FAMILY LAw IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE, chapters 2-6 (1977) [hereinafter cited as 
GLENDON, STATE, LAw AND FAMILY). 
84. WEITZMAN,supra note 76, at 1-134; Lindey observes the state's vital concern for marriage and the 
organization of the family. He describes marriage as the foundation of society. LINDEY,supra note 21, at 
8-4. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 6 Ill. App. 2d 310, 127 N.E.2d 673 (1955); In re De Pass, 231 S.c. 
134,97 S.E.2d 505 (1957). 
85. WEITZMAN, supra note 76, at 23-97; LINDEY, supra note 21, at 90-22. 
86. See Ryan v. Ryan, 277 So. 2d 266, 273 (Fla. 1973). "It must be remembered that the state has 
always been considered a 'third party' or 'third interest' in divorce and the family tie." Id. at 273. See also 
Linneman v. Linneman, 1 Ill. App.2d 48, 116 N.E.2d 182 (1953); In re Dittman's Estate, 232 Ind. 694, 
115 N.E.2d 125 (1953). 
87. Branca & Steinberg, Antenuptial Agreements Under California Law: An Examination of the Current Law 
and IN RE MARRIAGE OF DAWLEY, II U.S.F.L. REv. 317 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Branca & Steinberg). 
The authors note that courts impose rules on antenuptial contracts because of the importance of 
marriage.Id. at 328 n.51. See notes 78-88 and accompanying text supra. 
88. GLENDON, STATE, LAw AND FAMILY, supra note 83, at 170; see Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, supra 
note 21, at 150-51. See also Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 105,506 P.2d 719, 721 (1973). The 
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C. The General Requirements of Marital Contracts 
The courts closely scrutinize 89 marital contracts as shown by the various 
requirements the courts impose on antenuptial and postnuptial contracts.90 In 
general, courts follow a two step rule for determining the validity of marital 
contracts. First, the contract must be fair and reasonable in its financial provi-
sions.9! Second, if the contract is not fair, the wealthier party must have fully 
disclosed, before contract formation, his or her finances to the party who did not 
receive a "fair" amount under the contract.92 However, even ifthe disclosure was 
inadequate, a court may uphold the contract if the less wealthy party had 
independent knowledge of the wealthier party's finances before contract forma-
tion.93 Therefore, this rule requires that marital contracts be substantively fair 
or, alternatively, procedurally fair.94 
In addition to meeting the scrutiny for substantive and procedural fairness, 
marital contracts must, like all contracts, be free of fraud, coercion and duress.95 
Together these factors constitute a multitude of possible justifications for a court 
that decides to invalidate a marital contract and substitute its own judgment. 
Courts have not been hesitant to classify facts as falling within these exceptions.96 
1. Invalidation of Marital Contracts Because of Unfairness 
Because of the alternate nature of the general rule for marital contracts, 
fairness is a threshold question for the determination of contract validity.97 If a 
court determines that a marital contract is fair, the court will enforce the contract 
even in the absence of disclosure or independent knowledge.98 However, courts 
Oregon coun statp.d: "Antenuptial agreements concerning alimony should be enforced unless en-
forcement deprives a spouse of support that he or she cannot otherwise secure." Id. Connolly v. 
Connolly, 270 N.W.2d 44 (S.D. 1978). 
89. In re Estate of Strickland, 181 Neb. 478, 486, 149 N.W.2d 344, 352 (1967) ("scrutinize with care"); 
Bauer v. Bauer, lOr. App. 504, 505, 464 P.2d 710, 711 ("rigidly scrutinized"); Peste v. Peste, 1 Wash. 
App. 19, 23, 459 P.2d 70, 74 (1969) ("carefully scrutinize"). 
90. See generally Clark,Antenuptial Contracts, supra note 21, at 142-46; LINDEY,supra note 21, at 90-52. 
For a discussion of the requirements of marital contracts, see notes 90-98 and accompanying text infra. 
91. LINDEY, supra note 21, at 90-52. See § II.B infra. 
92. LINDEY, supra note 21, at 90-52. See § II.B. infra. 
93. LINDEY, supra note 21, at 90-52. See notes 98 and 134-37 and accompanying text infra. 
94. Branca & Steinberg, supra note 87, at 332. 
95. See generally WEITZMAN, supra note 76, at 344; A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 6 (1962). 
96. See § II1.C infra. 
97. LINDEY, supra note 21, at 90-53; Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, supra note 21, at 145. 
98. LINDEY,supra note 21, at 90-53; Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, supra note 21, at 145. Independent 
knowledge consists of knowledge about the prospective spouse's finances obtained from sources other 
than the prospective spouse. Examples of these sources include boarding in the same house for 20 
years, Pollock v. Jameson, 70 F.2d 756 (D.C. Cir. 1934); information from third parties, Landes v. 
Landes, 268 Ill. 11, 108 N.E. 691 (1911); and general community knowledge in a smaIl town, In re 
Whitmer, 224 Pa. 413, 73 A. 551 (1909). See I. BAXTER, MARITAL PROPERTY 451-52 (1973). 
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are quick to strike down an unfair contract when they find inadequate disclosure 
of a party's assets to the contractually disfavored party.99 
The term "fair" is subjective and not susceptible to a precise definition. 100 
Courts will consider many factors in determining the fairness of a marital 
contract.101 In deciding whether a marital contract is fair, courts will often 
compare what a spouse would have received under the otherwise applicable 
divorce statute with what that spouse would be receiving under the marital 
contract. 102 If the amount a spouse would receive under the marital contract 
varies greatly from the spouse's statutory entitlement, the court will consider the 
contract substantively unfair}03 However, the main reason for the creation of a 
marital contract may have been to depart from the scheme of property division 
imposed by the statute. For example, when a marriage terminates by the death of 
one party!04 the court will compare what the surviving spouse receives under 
the contract with the amount the spouse would receive under the applicable 
forced share statute. 105 A court will find that a contract is unfair when its terms 
provide a disproportionate benefit to one spouse. 106 
Property division upon divorce is an equity determination, which involves 
many factors. l07 Even when couples have formally executed an agreement em-
bodying their rights and obligations, courts often independently consider several 
factors in determining the fairness of the contract. lOS These factors include: (1) 
the situation of the parties; (2) the respective ages of the parties; (3) the respec-
tive property of the parties; (4) the parties' family ties; (5) all circumstances 
surrounding the contract's execution; (6) the length of the marriage; (7) both 
parties' understanding of the contract; and (8) the needs of the respective 
99. LINDEY, supra note 21, at 90-56 to -58; Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, supra note 21, at 145. 
100. See Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, supra note 21, at 145; LINDEY, supra note 21, at 90-53 to -54. 
101. LINDEY, supra note 21, at 90-53. 
102. linker v. linker, 28 Colo. App. 131, 133,470 P.2d 921, 923 (1970); Plant v. Plant, 320 So. 2d 
455,457 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Norris and Norris, 51 Or. App. 43, 47, 624 P.2d 636, 640 (1981); 
Kosik v. George, 253 Or. 15, 18,452 P.2d 560, 563 (1969); Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash. 2d 293, 
298, 494 P.2d 208, 213 (1972). 
103. See, e.g., linker v. Linker, 28 Colo. App. 131, 133,470 P.2d 921, 923 (1970), where the wife 
waived all statutory rights in her husband's estate of $ 100,000; Norris and Norris, 51 Or. App. 43, 624 
P.2d 636 (1981), where the wife waived all her rights to the $750,000 her husband brought to the 
marriage. 
104. E.g., Arnold v. Arnold, 261 Ark. 734, 746, 553 S.W.2d 251, 257 (1977). "The widow's rights 
would probably have been twice as valuable as the provision for her under the agreement." [d. See also 
Allison v. Stevens, 269 Ala. 288, 291, 112 So. 2d 451, 453 (1959) ("the value of the home which was 
devised to the complainant by the testator is greatly disproportionate to the value of complainant's 
rights in the estate of the testator." /d.). 
105. See note 104 supra. 
106. See cases cited in notes 102 and 103 supra. 
107. See notes 50 and 51 and accompanying text supra. For examples of cases in which antenuptial 
contracts operative at divorce were held void, see note 71 supra. 
108. LIN DEY, supra note 21, at 90-53. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hillegass, 431 Pa. 144,244 A.2d 672 
(1968); In Te Estate of Vallish, 431 Pa. 88, 244 A.2d 745 (1968); In Te Estate of Gelb, 425 Pa. 117,228 
A.2d 367 (1967). 
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spouses. IOU In addition, a court may weigh other factors, such as the number of 
children of each spouse, the life experience of the parties and the marital 
standard of living of the parties.uo Thus, a court has many subjective factors 
upon which to base its decision to invalidate a marital contract. 
One common type of marital contract involves mutual waivers of any interest 
in the other spouse's estate upon death.u l Courts tend to invalidate complete 
waivers of rights in the decedent spouse's estate when the estate is substantial.1l2 
Similarly, courts have also invalidated alimony provisions if the terms provide 
disproportionate benefits to the spouses.u3 Thus, the mere existence of a sig-
nificant difference between the spouse's rights without the marital contract 
versus those under the contract often renders the entire contract unfair and 
subsequently unenforceable. 1l4 
Statutes operative upon divorce and death reflect what legislators determine to 
be fair.ll5 In this sense, the law determines legal fairness, namely, what will 
achieve justice between the parties. However, parties who enter into marital 
contracts do so to avoid the operation of otherwise applicable law.u 6 Many 
reasons may exist for avoiding the reach of these statutes.1l7 The law may not 
suit individual situations, with varying needs and responsibilities.us By entering 
109. LINDEY, supra note 21, at 90-53. 
liD. Hartz v. Hartz, 248 Md. 47, 234 A.2d 865 (1967); In re Estate of Kester, 486 Pa. 349, 405 A.2d 
1244 (1979). 
111. LINDEY,supra note 21, at 90-31. One court notes that antenuptial contracts are usually designed 
to affect a spouse's statutory rights of inheritance. In re Estate of Harrison, 456 Pa. 356, 359, 319 A.2d 5, 
7 (1974). 
112. Linker v. Linker, 28 Colo. App. 131,470 P.2d 921 (1970) ($100,000); In re Estate of Grassman, 
183 Neb. 147, 158 N.W.2d 673 (1968) ($56,000); Kosik v. George, 253 Or. 15,452 P.2d 560 (1969) 
($90,000). In striking down a waiver contract, one court noted the provision for the surviving wife was 
disporportionate to the husband's wealth. Kosik v. George, 253 Or. 15,452 P.2d 560 (1969). In this case, 
the wife waived all rights in the husband's estate when the estate was worth $90,000. 
113. Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). A provision allowing $1,000 per 
month for support is unfair when the husband is worth $3 million. Id. at 1115. Wilson v. Wilson, 354 
S.W.2d 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962). A provision allowing only $5,000 for support in total when the 
husband is worth $100,000 is also unfair. Id. at 537. Bauer v. Bauer, lOr. App. 504, 464 P.2d 710 
(1970). A provision for only $50 per month alimony is similarly unfair when the husband is worth 
$120,OOO.Id. at 506, 464 P.2d at 711. 
114. See notes 102-06 and accompanying text supra. 
115. Fellows, Simon &: Rau, Public Attitudes About Property Distribution At Death and Intestate Succession 
Laws in the United States, AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH]' 319, 321 (1978). Intestacy statutes, however, reflect 
what the testator would have wanted. Id. at 321. See note 197 and accompanying text infra. 
116. LINDEY, supra note 21, at 90-31. Lindey observes that parties enter an antenuptial contract to 
avoid the operation of law upon their property.Id. See In re Estate of Strickland, 181 Neb. 478, 149 
N.W.2d 344 (1967); In re Perelman's Estate, 438 Pa. 112, 263 A.2d 375 (1970). 
117. GLENDON, STATE, LAw AND FAMILY, supra note 83, at 171. Glendon notes that couples may 
require differing financial arrangements depending on whether it is a first marriage, whether both 
spouses work, whether either spouse has children from a previous marriage and whether either spouse 
has substantial property. [d. She further notes the possible importance of family, regional and religious 
custom.Id. 
118. [d. 
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into a marital contract, a couple creates its own marital equities. 119 A marital 
contract is thus presumptively unfair under the law merely because it varies from 
statutory standards of fairness. 12o Many marital contracts are therefore pre-
sumed by courts to be unfair, and thus courts require disclosure for validity.121 
2. Nondisclosure Leads to Invalidation 
As previously noted,122 the basic rule for the validity of marital contracts 
provides that substantively unfair contracts may be valid if they are fairly 
made. 123 This procedural fairness requirement is rooted in the concept of 
disclosure. 124 If a contract is unfair, a court will uphold it only if the favored 
party under the contract has made a full disclosure of the nature and value of his 
property.125 A finding of disclosure is conclusive; 126 if disclosure was proper, the 
contract is valid regardless of fairness. 127 
Courts stress the requirement of disclosure because a confidential relationship 
exists between the parties.128 The objective of disclosure is to prevent overreach-
ing129 between parties, when trust may make one party vulnerable to the 
other.130 As one court has stated: "the real test in a determination of the validity 
of an anten uptial agreement is whether there was overreaching, that is, whether 
in the atmosphere and environment of the confidential relationship there was 
unfairness or inequity in the procuring of the agreement."131 Thus, in looking at 
the disclosure between the parties, the court will subjectively determine if the 
making of the contract was fair. 132 While in some cases a finding of overreaching 
119. Gartner v. Gartner, 246 Minn. 319, 323, 74 N.W.2d 809, 813 (1956) (these contracts "exclude 
the operation of law in respect to the property rights of each insofar as these rights are covered by the 
contract"); and Estate of Slight, 467 Pa. 619, 623, 359 A.2d 773, 775 (1975). See note 105 supra. 
120. In re Estate of Strickland, 181 Neb. 478, 487, 149 N .W.2d 344, 353 (1967). The court notes that 
every antenuptial agreement is designed to be unfair by the standards set forth in the statute of descent 
and distribution. Id. 
121. See notes 90-94 and accompanying text supra. 
122. See notes 90-94 and accompanying text supra. 
123. LINDEY, supra note 21, at 90-52; Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, supra note 21, at 145. 
124. LINDEY, supra note 21, at 90-54. 
125. Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, supra note 21, at 145. Clark states that if the contract is unfair, then 
the contractually favored party must fully and accurately disclose his property. Id. See Wylie v. Wylie, 
249 Ark. 316, 459 S.W.2d 127 (1970); Linker v. Linker, 28 Colo. App. 131,470 P.2d 921 (1970); Potter 
v. Collin, 321 So. 2d 128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); and Bauer v. Bauer, lOr. App. 504,464 P.2d 710 
(1970). 
126. LINDEY, supra note 21, at 90-54. 
127. /d. 
128. See notes 78-82 and accompanying text supra. 
129. LINDEY, supra note 21, at 90-55. 
130. WEITZMAN, supra note 76, at 344; Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, supra note 21, at 144. 
131. Hartz v. Hartz, 248 Md. 47, 53, 234 A.2d 865, 871 (1967). 
132. {d. See also Linker v. Linker, {!8 Colo. App. 131, 133,470 P.2d 921, 923 (1970), where the wife 
was "overreached" because she understood little English, did not understand the effect of the agree-
ment, and had no knowledge of the husband's assets. Wilson v. Wilson, 354 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1962); Kosik v. George, 253 Or. 15,452 P.2d 560 (1969). 
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may be justified, courts tend to overuse this subjective determination to invali-
date contracts to which parties have freely agreed. '33 
This high degree of judicial scrutiny is apparent in cases where courts have 
found inadequate disclosure even though a disfavored party has had general 
knowledge of the other party's assets. '34 Courts are split on the issue of whether 
general knowledge of the other party's assets fulfills the general disclosure 
requirement. 135 In one case, the parties had been married for a year and a half, 
had kept joint bank accounts and had filed ajoint income tax return. '36 Never-
theless, the court held that the husband inadequately disclosed his assets to his 
former wife, pursuant to the formation of an antenuptial agreement prior to 
their remarriage. '37 Thus, the wife's knowledge gained from the previous mar-
riage was not general knowledge and did not fulfill the disclosure require-
ment. '3S 
Another way in which courts expand the disclosure requirement is through 
shifting the burden of proof as to the validity of the contract.139 Usually, the 
burden of proof as to the invalidity of a marital contract is on the person who 
challenges it. '40 However, once a court finds that a marital contract is substan-
tively unfair because of disproportionate provisions, a presumption of inten-
tional concealment arises. '41 To rebut a presumption of intentional concealment, 
133. See notes 131 and 132 and accompanying text supra and notes 134-43 and accompanying text 
infra. 
134. See, e.g., Norris and Norris, 51 Or. App. 43, 624 P.2d 636 (1981), where the parties agreed to 
keep the money brought to the marriage separate, and the wife knew the husband was worth $468,000, 
when he was actually worth $750,000; Kosik v. George, 253 Or. 15,452 P.2d 560 (1969), where the 
parties waived all rights in the other's estate, and wife knew of the husband's real estate holdings, when 
the husband was actually worth $100,000; Arnold v. Arnold, 261 Ark. 734, 553 S.W.2d 251 (1977), 
where the parties had previously been married and had filed ajoint tax return; 'and Linker v. Linker, 28 
Colo. App. 131,470 P.2d 921 (1970), where the wife had general knowledge of her husband's assets. 
135. LINDEY,supra note 21, at 90-55. Campare cases cited in note 134 supra with cases cited in note 98 
supra. 
[d. 
136. Arnold v. Arnold, 261 Ark. 734, 553 S.W.2d 251 (1977). 
137. !d. 
138. [d. 
139. LINDEY, supra note 21, at 90-109. See note 141 and cases cited infra. 
140. LIN DEY, supra note 21, at 90-108. 
141. [d. at 90-109. 
If the agreement is unjust and unreasonable to the wife on its face, or is clearly dispropor-
tionate to the husband's wealth, a presumption of intentional concealment arises. The bumen 
shifts, and it is then incumbent on those asserting the validity of the agreement to show that the 
wife entered into it with full knowledge of all the material facts affecting her interests. 
See also Hartz v. Hartz, 248 Md. 47,53,234 A.2d 865, 871 (1967), where the court noted "the bumen 
is cast upon the one who relies on the agreement to prove that it was entered into voluntarily, freely and 
with full knowledge of its meaning and effect;" Wilson v. Wilson, 170 A.2d 679 (Me. 1961), in which the 
court stated "the person claiming under the contract has the bumen of presenting evidence tending to 
make the nonexistence of fraud as probable as its existence;" Kosik v. George, 253 Or. 15, 18,452 P.2d 
560,563 (1969), where the court placed "the bum en on those claiming under it in his right to show that 
there was a full knowledge and understanding on the part of the wife at the time of execution of all the 
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the party asserting the validity of the contract must prove that the other party 
executed the contract "with full knowledge of all the material facts affecting her 
interests."142 This simple shift in the burden of proof prevents courts from 
enforcing marital contracts.143 The presumption assumes nondisclosure and 
unfair concealment; the balance is against validity.144 Moreover, some courts 
require rebuttal of this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 145 
Courts have also strengthened disclosure requirements by placing an affirma-
tive duty to inform regarding finances on the favored party under the contract, 
rather than treating the parties as equals. 146 Courts have even required the 
favored party under the contract to ensure that the other party fully under-
stands the terms of the contract. 147 This duty requires explanation of the con-
tract's effect on the disfavored party to the disfavored party.148 Such an ex plana-
tion is especially necessary if the court finds a great disparity in education149 or 
business experience150 between the parties. Furthermore, courts often will not 
uphold a marital contract if the disfavored party did not have the benefit of 
independent advice to protect against overreaching.151 Some courts prefer that 
couples satisfy this requirement through independent consultation with legal 
counseJ.I52 Nevertheless, courts have held that couples may fulfill the require-
ment by consultation with any independent party.153 
facts materially affecting her interests;" and In re Estate of Strickland, 181 Neb. 478, 485,149 N.W.2d 
344,352 (1967), in which the court stated "[tJhe burden is upon the husband, or his representatives, to 
show that an antenuptial contract apparently unjust to the wife was fairly procured." 
142. LINDEY, supra note 21, at 90-109. See, e.g., Moats v. Moats, 450 P.2d 64 (Colo. 1969); Linker v. 
Linker, 28 Colo. App. 131,470 P.2d 921 (1970); Posner v. Posner, 257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972); In re 
Strickland's Estate, 181 Neb, 478,149 N.w.2d 344 (1967); In re Slight'S Estate, 457 Pa, 619, 359 A,2d 
773 (1975). 
143. See notes 141 and 142 supra. 
144. See note 141 supra. 
145. In re Estate of Harber, 104 Ariz. 79,440 P.2d 7 (1969); In re Hillegass' Estate, 431 Pa. 144,244 
A.2d 672 (1968). 
146. In re Estate of Strickland, 181 Neb. 478, 149 N.W.2d 344 (1967); Kosik v. George, 253 Or. 15, 
452 P.2d 560 (1969). 
147. Allison v. Stevens, 269 Ala. 288,112 So. 2d 451 (1959); Linker v. Linker, 28 Colo. App. 131,470 
P.2d 921 (1970); Plant v. Plant, 320 So. 2d 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Norris and Norris, 51 Or. 
App. 43, 624 P.2d 636 (1981); Kosik v. George, 253 Or. 15,452 P.2d 560 (1969). 
148. See Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash. 2d 293, 299, 494 P.2d 208, 214 (1972). An Oregon 
court explained that it was the husband's duty to fully inform his wife of the rights she was surrender-
ing. Kosik v. George, 253 Or. 15, 18,452 P.2d 560, 563 (1969). See also Allison v. Stevens, 269 Ala. 288, 
112 So. 2d 451 (1959), where an Alabama court required the favored party to ensure that the disfavored 
party had full knowledge of her interest in the estate.Id. at 291, 112 So. 2d at 453. 
149. Linkerv. Linker, 28 Colo. App. 131,470 P.2d 921 (1970); Kosik v. George, 253 Or. 15,452 P.2d 
560 (1969). 
150. In re Estate of Grassman, 183 Neb. 147, 158 N.W.2d 673 (1968); Kosik v. George, 253 Or. 15, 
452 P.2d 560 (1969). 
151. Allison v. Stevens, 269 Ala. 288, 112 So. 2d 451 (1959); Linker v. Linker, 28 Colo. App. 131,470 
P.2d 921 (1970); Norris and Norris, 51 Or. App. 43, 624 P.2d 636 (1981); Kosik v. George, 253 Or. 15, 
452 P.2d 560 (1969). . 
152. Linker v. Linker, 28 Colo. App. 131, 133,470 P.2d 921, 923 (1970); Norris and Norris, 51 Or. 
App. 43,46,624 P.2d 636, 640 (1981); Kosik v. George, 253 Or. 15, 18,452 P.2d 560, 562 (1969). 
153. Allison v. Stevens, 269 Ala. 288,112 So. 2d 451 (1959); Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wash. 2d 
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3. Invalidation Through Duress 
A third factor which many courts consider in determining the validity of 
marital contracts is duress.154 One court defines duress as overcoming someone's 
will by pressure which forces him to comply with demands he would not ordinar-
ily succumb to.155 A finding of duress generally entitles the exploited party to 
void the contract. 156 
Courts define duress more expansively in the area of marital contracts than 
they do in other areas of contract law. 157 The general rule regarding marital 
contracts is that the disfavored party under the contract must not be too hurried 
into the contract.158 Thus, in their analysis, courts examine all the circumstances 
surrounding the execution of the contract as well as the possibility of the more 
traditional types of und ue inft uence, such as physical and psychological threat. 159 
Courts have found duress when the making of the contract and the marriage 
have occurred too closely together.160 Courts have even extended the concept of 
duress to encompass a situation where a woman entered into a marital contract 
to avoid possible embarrassment before friends. 161 Courts also void marital 
293,299,494 P.2d 208, 214 (1972). The advising party must not be allied with the other contracting 
party. For example, the husband, his lawyer or his brother are not independent parties to the wife. Id. 
154. In re Sayegh's Estate. 118 Cal. App. 2d 327, 257 P.2d 995 (1953); Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 
Illl (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Petru v. Petru, 4 Ill. App. 2d 1, 123 N.E.2d 352 (1954); Wilson v. 
Wilson, 354 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962); Norris and Norris, 51 Or. App. 43, 624 P.2d 636 (1981); 
Bauer v. Bauer, 1 Or. App. 504,464 P.2d 710 (1970). 
155. Wilson v. Wilson, 354 S.W.2d 532, 545 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962), citing 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 168, at 
525. See also S. WILLISTON, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS §§ 1601-27 (1920); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE 
LAw OF CONTRACTS 261-73 (1977). 
156. WEITZMAN, supra note 76, at 344. 
157. See notes 158-70 and accompanying text inFra. See also GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY, supra note 
29, at 67 n.60. 
158. LINDEY,supra note 21, at 90-88. See In re Maag's Estate, 119 Neb. 237, 228 N.W. 537 (1930); 
White v. White, ll2 Neb. 850, 201 N.W. 662 (1924). 
159. See, e.g., Petru v. Petru, 4 Ill. App. 2d 1, 12, 123 N.E.2d 352, 357 (1954). The court reviewed 
Illinois cases concerning marital contracts and noted: 
These cases reveal that courts consider all the circumstances surrounding the marriage of 
the parties, their respective ages, abilities, experience and understanding, and the period of 
time which elapses between execution of the contract and the marriage. It has not been 
expressly stated, but obviously what courts have perceived in the case of antenuptial agree-
ments made a day or two before marriage is the opportunity for undue pressure on the part of 
the husband. 
/d. at 12, 123 N.E.2d at 357. See LINDEY, supra note 21, at 90-88. 
160. Bauer v. Bauer, lOr. App. 504, 464 P.2d 710 (1970) (day of wedding); Wilson v. Wilson, 354 
S.W.2d 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962) (immediately after the wedding); Plant v. Plant, 320 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (day before wedding); Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) 
(within 24 hours of wedding); Norris and Norris, 51 Or. App. 43, 624 P.2d 636 (1981) (on the way to the 
courthouse). 
161. Wilson v. Wilson, 354 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962). In that case, immediately after the 
wedding ceremony, and in the presence of guests, the husband took the marital contract out of the 
glove compartment and asked the wife to sign it. The wife testified that although "she had never seen 
the instrument before, ... because she did not want to create a scene before the guests, she signed it." Id. 
The wife's possible embarrassment operated to void the contract. Id. 
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contracts on the grounds of duress when one spouse holds the marital contract 
out as a precondition to the marriage. 162 
A recent Florida case presents an extreme example of a court's willingness to 
find duress. 163 In that case, the husband demanded that his prospective wife sign 
an antenuptial contract within twenty four hours of the wedding. 164 The court 
noted that after all the wedding arrangements were set, the husband refused to 
participate in the ceremony until the prospective wife signed the contract.165 In 
its analysis, the court created a presumption of undue influence, based on the 
"coercive circumstances" and the fact that the contract provided the spouses with 
disproportionate benefits. 166 Similar to a presumption of intentional conceal-
ment, a presumption of undue influence is difficult for the contractually favored 
party to rebut. 161 Although the woman in the present case had been married 
twice previously, and had for a year discussed with her future husband the 
possibility of a marital contract, the husband could not rebut the presumption of 
undue influence. 168 The court stated that the husband acted unfairly by placing 
the wife in a position in which she faced the possibility of losing a lifetime of 
great wealth.169 According to the court, the wife was unduly influenced by "a 
sudden stark awareness of the potential immediate loss of a future life of 
enormous grandeur."11o 
D. The Importance of Enforcing Marital Contracts 
Courts no longer consider marital contracts to be against public policy.111 In 
fact, marital contracts can do much to induce marital tranquility and avoid 
disputes.112 Theoretically, parties have the right to contract regarding their 
property; nevertheless, in practice, this right is often illusory .113 Thus, courts 
162. Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). The court referred to the 
husband's demand as an ultimatum of "no agreement, no wedding." [d. at 1116. Arnold v. Arnold, 261 
Ark. 734, 553 S.W.2d 251 (1977). In this case the prospective groom dictated the terms of the contract, 
and called off the wedding when the contract was questioned. [d. at 740, 553 S.W.2d at 254. Norris and 
Norris, 51 Or. App. 43, 624 P.2d 636 (1981). There the wife said she felt her husband would not marry 
her without the contract. [d. at 47, 624 P.2d at 639. 
163. Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). 
164. Id. at 1114. 
165. [d. 
166. [d. at 1115. 
167. See § II.B supra. 
168. Lutgert v. Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111, 1116 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). 
169. !d. at 1116. 
170. [d. 
171. LINDEY, supra note 21, at 90-29 to -30. 
172. LINDEY, supra note 21, at 90-40. Homer Clark agrees that marital contracts provide "a useful 
method by which the spouses may be assured that their property will be disposed of in accordance with 
their wishes." Clark, Antenuptial Crmtracts, supra note 21, at 142. 
173. See § II.B & C supra. See also WE1TZMAN, supra note 76, at 356. 
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give parties the right to enter into marital contracts, but later take this right 
away.174 
Although prevention of the abuse of marital contracts is im portant,l 75 many of 
the requirements imposed by the courts exceed this purpose.176 The basic rule of 
fairness or disclosure is the standard for compliance. 177 However, many courts 
have significantly and needlessly expanded this requirement. 178 General knowl-
edge by one spouse of his partner's wealth seems adequate to safeguard against 
abuse.179 Classifying possible embarrassment180 or loss of riches181 as duress is an 
expansive exercise of judicial discretion. Moreover, a finding of duress by courts 
based merely on the fact that the parties executed the contract shortly before the 
wedding182 or the fact that the execution of the contract was a precondition of 
the marriage183 is similarly difficult to justify as actually being duress. The courts' 
invalidation of marital contracts through such an interpretation of contract 
requirements significantly expands the stated requirements of fairness or disclo-
sure.184 In addition, the procedural burdens imposed by the courts regarding 
disclosure185 and the subjectivity186 expand the general requirements of marital 
contracts. The marital relationship should not deprive the parties of their auton-
omy and their right to contract as individuals.187 
Courts should enforce marital contracts whenever the parties act voluntarily 
and have a general appreciation of their conduct. 188 Parties who have thought-
fully entered into such contracts should not be permitted later to disavow their 
contractual duties. l89 Moreover, such contracts are no less voluntary because 
they resulted from one party's insistence on the contract as a precondition to the 
wedding or from a fear of a loss of riches or possible embarrassment.19o The 
creation of the contract is still a voluntary act. Further, inadequate disclosure 
174. Interspousal Relations, supra note 36, at 159. 
175. See notes 78-82 and accompanying text supra. 
176. See § n.B & C supra. 
177. See notes 91-94 and accompanying text supra. 
178. See § II.B & C supra. 
179. See note 93 and accompanying text supra. 
180. See note 161 and accompanying text supra. 
181. See notes 169-70 and accompanying text supra. 
182. See note 160 and accompanying text supra. 
183. See note 162 and accompanying text supra. 
184. See § II.B & C supra. 
185. See notes 141-44 and accompanying text supra. 
186. See notes 100-10 and 132-33 and accompanying text supra. 
187. See generally WEITZMAN, supra note 76. 
188. Rockerv. Rocker, 13 Ohio Misc. 199 (1967). The court noted that the marital contract should be 
upheld because the woman knew what she was doing and did it voluntarily. Id. at 208. 
189. Id. 
190. Barnhill v. Barnhill, 386 So. 2d 749 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980). In that case, the prospective husband 
issued an ultimatum of "no contract, no wedding." While the woman subsequently signed with reluc-
tance, it was still very much a voluntary act. Id. at 752. 
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seems irrelevant to the disclosure requirement when the marital contract calls for 
a complete waiver of rights.191 If a husband freely agrees to relinquish all interest 
in his wife's assets, the extent of her wealth is not important.192 
A strong similarity exists between wills and marital contracts; both embody the 
clear intent of a party as to how the party desires to distribute his property upon 
the occurrence of a future event. IDa Courts are reluctant to rewrite a will;194 in 
contrast, however ,judges seem to be quite willing to invalidate a marital contract. 
Thus, with respect to marital contracts, the judge may have an impact on the 
ultimate disposition of the property. It is true that wills are executed with special 
formalities;195 nevertheless, marital contracts are also solemn legal transac-
tions.196 The same reluctance of courts to vary provisions ofa will should extend 
to the judicial treatment of marital contracts. The same personal freedom to 
determine the disposition of one's own property is in question with regard to 
both wills and marital contracts. 
Intestate succession presents a special problem. In intestacy, a decedent dies 
without a will. Intestacy statutes attempt to reflect the distributive intent of the 
decedent.197 The state attempts to do what the decedent would have wanted. ID8 
Marital contracts, on the other hand, spell out the intent of the decedent spouse. 
Theoretically, marital contracts obviate the need for intestacy statutes. However, 
courts may refuse to enforce a marital contract and instead apply the intestacy 
law.199 Such an application violates the very purpose of the intestacy law which 
attempts to reflect the intent of the decedent. 
Protection against possible abuses of a confidential relationship is important. 
However, the remedies imposed by U.S. courts have exceededjustifiable bounds 
by interfering with a couple's freedom to contract.200 In addition, the unpredict-
191. In re Estate of Strickland, 181 Neb. 478, 149 N.W.2d 344 (1967). The court observed that 
nondisclosure was of little consequence because she knew she would get nothing under the contract. Id. 
at 486, 149 N.W.2d at 353. 
192. Id. 
193. M. RHEINSTEIN & M. GLENDON, THE LAw OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES 55 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 
RHEIN STEIN & GLENDON]. See Clark, Antenuptial Contracts, supra note 21, at 141. 
194. See, e.g., In re Pavlinko's Estate, 394 Pa. 562, 148 A.2d 528 (1959). 
195. RHEINSTEIN & GLENDON, supra note 193, at 135-39; R. MENNELL, WILLS AND TRUSTS IN A 
NUTSHELL 42-44 (1979). Both of the cited sources note the formalities required by the New York statute 
and the Uniform Probate Code. The general requirements are: (i) a writing; (ii) signed by the testator; 
(iii) attested by witnesses; (iv) who also sign the will. Id. 
196. See notes 44-47 and accompanying text supra. 
197. Fellows, Simon & Rau, Public Attitudes About Property Distribution At Death and Inte5tate Succession 
Laws in the United States, AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 319, 321 (1978). 
198. !d. at 321. The authors note that society values testamentary freedom highly, and that having 
property pass to whom decedents want to favor, even in absence of a will, is part of testamentary 
freedom.ld. at 324. They note that freedom should be curtailed only to satisfy an overriding societal 
interest. I d. 
199. See, e.g., Arnold v. Arnold, 261 Ark. 734, 553 S.W.2d 251 (1977); Kosik v. George, 253 Or. 15, 
452 P.2d 560 (1969). 
200. Interspousal Relations, supra note 36, at 156, 159. 
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ability of rulings regarding marital contracts may produce the undesirable 
result of encouraging suits by disaffected parties who no longer wish to honor 
their agreements. 
III. THE ENFORCEMENT OF MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS IN GREAT BRITAIN 
Like the United States, Great Britain has a tradition of dealing with marital 
contracts. In Great Britain, spouses or prospective spouses may not contract 
regarding the economic consequences of a future possible divorce.201 Such 
contracts are void as against public policy,202 similar to the policy that formerly 
existed in the United States before the recent trend finding marital contracts 
contemplating divorce valid.203 However, prospective spouses may contract in 
advance regarding termination of their marriage by death.204 In Great Britain 
marital contracts are subsumed within the wider concept of "marriage settle-
ments."205 
A. Definition of Marriage Settlement 
Marriage settlements, which have been popular for centuries in Great Brit-
ain,206 are more than contracts between spouses or prospective spouses.207 Such 
settlements, which are "deeply rooted in the customs of the propertied 
classes,''208 traditionally allow property to be kept within a family.209 Parliament 
encourages these settlements through substantial estate tax advantages.210 A 
classic example of a marriage settlement is when some benefactor, such as a 
spouse or his family, places income producing property, such as money or land, 
in a trust from which the spouses receive income for life.211 Upon the death of 
the surviving spouse, the children receive the trust property.212 
Any property transaction which makes some "continuing provision" relating 
to marriage is a marriage settlement. 213 British courts interpret this definition of 
201. BROMLEY, supra note 32, at 165; M. FURMSTON, CHESHIRE AND FIFOOT'S LAw OF CoNTRACT 367 
(1976) [hereinafter cited as CHESHIRE]; GLENDON, STATE, LAw AND FAMILY, supra note 83, at 170. 
202. CHESHIRE, supra note 201, at 367-68. 
203. See § I supra. 
204. BROMLEY, supra note 32, at 540. 
205. See id. at 538-41. 
206. M. PuxTON, FAMILY LAw 275 (1971) [hereinafter cited as PUXTON]; SToNE,supra note 35, at 7. 
207. On marriage settlements generally, see BROMLEY, supra note 32, at 537-43; S. CRETNEY, PRINCI-
PLES OF FAMILY LAw 170-72 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CRETNEY]; RAYDEN's,supra note 33, at 792-94. 
208. STONE, supra note 35, at 7. 
209. PuXTON, supra note 206, at 275. 
210. J. RAYMOND & W. MARTIN, EVERY WOMAN'S LAWVER 58 (1965) [hereinafter cited as RAYMOND & 
MARTIN]. As the authors note: "By far and away the most important [tax advantage] is the potential 
saving of estate duty." Id. 
211. STONE, supra note 35, at 7. 
212. Id. 
213. PuXTON, supra note 206, at 276. A settlement requires property to be "settled" upon some 
beneficiary, usually the parties or their children. RAYDEN'S, supra note 33, at 792-93. 
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a marriage settlement broadly,214 and include within the concept of a marriage 
settlement such varied transactions as: (1) a husband's executing an insurance 
policy on his own life for his wife's benefit;215 (2) the husband's taking sole title to 
the house when the wife has made a contribution to the purchase price;216 and 
(3) any trust containing property.217 A settlement does not, however, involve an 
absolute assignment or gift of property.218 The settlement cannot give rights to 
any beneficiary in fee simple;219 there must be some restrictions.22o 
Marital contracts constitute only one species of marriage settlement. While 
marriage settlements traditionally were made by the couples' respective fanii-
lies,221 the parties themselves may make settlements before or after marriage.222 
Such marital contracts make a continuing provision for a spouse's benefit. 223 
B. British Courts' Power to Vary Settlements Upon Divorce 
While British couples may not contract regarding divorce,224 British courts 
have extensive discretionary powers regarding distribution of property upon 
divorce.225 Included within these broad powers is the power to vary a couple's 
marriage settlement upon divorce.226 The 1973 Matrimonial Causes Act 
(MCA)227 provides that, upon divorce, the courts in their discretion may vary 
marriage settlements for the benefit of either spouse or any children from the 
marriage.228 However, the MCA provides that a court should vary marriage 
214. BROMLEY,supra note 32, at 538; CRETNEY,supra note 207, at 170; RAYDEN's,supra note 33, at 
792-94. 
215. B. PASSINGHAM & C. HARMER, PRACTICE IN MATRIMONIAL CAUSES 114 (1979). 
216. PuXTON, supra note 206, at 277. 
217. [d. at 276. 
218. BROMLEY, supra note 32, at 539; RAYDEN'S, supra note 33, at 793, 795. 
219. BROMLEY, supra note 32, at 539. 
220. RAYDEN'S, supra note 33, at 793. Examples include restrictions upon powers of alienation, of 
devising, and of transmitting. [d. 
[d. 
221. RAYMOND & MARTIN, supra note 210, at 57; STONE, supra note 35, at 7. 
222. RAYMOND & MARTIN, supra note 210, at 60. The authors note: 
Of course, it is possible for one of the parties to the marriage him - or her - self to make an 
outright gift to the other spouse or a settlement on occasion of marriage. The same rules apply 
as in the case of a gift or settlement made by any other person. 
223. BROMLEY, supra note 32, at 539. 
224. See note 201 supra. 
225. Hahlo, Matrimonial Property Regimes: Yesterday, Today arul Tomorrow, 11 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 455, 
473 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hahlo]. He notes that the courts have "far reaching discretionary 
powers" upon divorce to redistribute property and order the payment of maintenance. /d. 
226. Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973, section 24(l)(c), reprinted in M. BERKIN & M. YOUNG, MAT-
RIMONIAL SUITS AND PROPERTY PROCEEDINGS (1978) [hereinafter cited as BERKIN & YOUNG]. 
227. The Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973 is law in Great Britain and governs all matrimonial 
proceedings including divorce, annulments, and separations. For a discussion of this Act and other 
recent reforms in British law,see GLENDON, STATE, LAw AND FAMILY,supra note 83, at 148-54, 192-201, 
255-58, 280-82. 
228. BERKIN & YOUNG, supra note 226. 
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settlements only when necessary to provide relief unavailable from any other 
source, such as individually owned property.229 Thus, under the MCA, a court 
examines marriage settlements when necessary in dividing the property pur-
suant to divorce.23o 
In examining a marriage settlement, the MCA requires that British courts 
consider several factors. 231 As to each party, the court must examine: present 
and future resources, needs and responsibilities; marital standard of living; age, 
physical and mental condition; contributions to the family's welfare; and possible 
loss of future pension rights.232 The court thereby attempts to place each party 
in the same financial position as before the divorce.233 However, such an object is 
virtually impossible for the court to attain unless the couple is wealthy, because 
the same amount of money after divorce now must support two households.234 
Because the court must subjectively weigh factors, the court has broad discretion 
to vary marriage settlements upon divorce.235 
C. British Courts' Power to Vary Settlements Upon Death 
The British courts also have power to vary marriage settlements after the 
death of a spouse.236 The Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependents) 
Act of 1975237 (lA) permits the variation of marriage settlements when one 
spouse has died,23s for the benefit of the surviving spouse, any child of the 
marriage or the entire family.239 
The IA is designed to protect the surviving dependents of a decedent 
229. RAYDEN'S, supra note 33, at 803. "There are four types of capital provision orders available in 
cases of divorce, judicial separation and nullity: (i) lump sum orders; (ii) capital transfer orders; (iii) 
settlement of property orders; (iv) variation of settlement orders." CRETNEY, supra note 207, at 168. 
230. RAYDEN'S, supra note 33, at 790. However, the court does not have to exercise .its financial 
division powers. Such exercise is within its discretion. The court may simply make no order. CRETNEY, 
supra note 207, at 172. 
231. RAYDEN'S, supra note 33, at 800. See also CRETNEY, supra note 207, at 172-90, for an expanded 
discussion of principles applied by the court in exercising discretion. 
232. G. BROWN, BROWN ON DIVORCE 1611 (1974); CRETNEY, supra note 207, at 172-90. 
233. RAYDEN's,supra note 33, at 800. The court must attempt to place parties in the same financial 
position they would have been if there was no divorce and each spouse had fulfilled his financial 
obligations to the other spouse. ld. 
234. See ill. 
235. CRETNEY,supra note 207, at 172. One author notes that "the nature and extent of the variation is 
entirely in the court's discretion." B. PASSINGHAM, MATRIMONIAL CAUSES ACT 1973, at 130 (1974). 
Another scholar agrees: "In varying these established rights in whatever way it thinks fit, the discretion 
of the Court under section 24 is unlimited." RAYDEN'S, supra note 33, at 800. 
236. STONE, supra note 35, at 163. 
237. This Inheritance Act governs all applications to a court for family provision by surviving 
dependents of a decedent. See STONE, supra note 35, at 161-69. 
238. Inheritance Act § 2; STONE, supra note 35, at 163. 
239. Inheritance Act§ 1; SToNE,supra note 35, at 162. The court has the power to order payments of 
lump sums or transfers of property as necessary for any dependent of the decedent, not just the family. 
lao at 162-63. Any dependent of the decedent may apply, even a cohabitant. ld. at 162. However, 
marriage settlements may be varied only for family members. ld. at 163. 
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spouse. 240 When a spouse dies, the surviving spouse or any other dependent may 
apply to the court for financial assistance.241 While Great Britain does give the 
surviving spouse and children rights of intestate succession,242 the dependents 
have no right of statutory forced share243 if they are excluded from the dece-
dent's wil1. 244 Thus, the IA helps to prevent possible destitution of surviving 
dependents. 245 
Under the lA, the surviving spouse is entitled to a reasonable financial benefit, 
whether or not required for his or her maintenance. 246 In contrast, the children 
or family may only receive reasonable maintenance.247 The determination of 
what is reasonable, whether for maintenance or not, is entirely within the court's 
discretion.248 The court must consider the same factors in determining the 
possible variation of marriage settlements in the case of death as it must consider 
in the determination of the possible variation of marriage settlements upon 
divorce.249 Again, the court uses its discretion in deciding what is "reasonable" 
for the applicant. 
IV. A POSSIBLE CIVIL LAW SOLUTION TO THE WIDESPREAD UNENFORCEMENT OF 
MARITAL CONTRACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
Under present U.S. law, marital contracts do not fulfill their promise as 
important mechanisms for embodying marital expectations. Although courts 
should police all contracts for fraud,250 U.S. courts go much further and tend to 
void a marital contract merely when they consider the contract to be a bad 
bargain.251 The U.S. courts too often substitute their idea of fairness for the 
spouses' contractually stated idea of fairness.252 Such an approach, while ensur-
ing against fraud, promotes the loss of the great potential of marital contracts to 
allow self-determination of one's own marital property. 
240. Inheritance Act § 1; STONE, supra note 35, at 161-64. 
241. Inheritance Act § 1; STONE, supra note 35, at 162. 
242. See Hahlo, supra note 225, at 471, for a discussion of how the Parliament has "substantially 
improved the rights of the surviving spouse on the death intestate of the first-dying spouse." [d. 
243. A statutory forced share is a share of the decedent's estate that is guaranteed to the surviving 
spouse; this share is indefeasibly vested against any testamentary disposition. RHEIN STEIN & GLENDON, 
supra note 193, at 96. 
244. STONE, supra note 35, at 159. 
245. See id. at 162-64. 
246. Inheritance Act § 1; STONE,supra note 35, at 162. As noted infra, the court will consider the same 
factors as noted in § III.B and including the spouse's conduct and any other relevant matter in 
determining a reasonable provision. [d. at 163. The court must also consider what the applicant 
reasonably might have received if the marriage had terminated by divorce and not death. [d. 
247. Inheritance Act § 1; STONE, supra note 35, at 162. 
248. Inheritance Act § 1; STONE, supra note 35, at 162-64. 
249. Inheritance Act § 3; STONE, supra note 35, at 163. See section V(B) supra. 
250. GLENDON, STATE, LAw AND FAMILY, supra note 83, at 170. 
251. See § II supra. 
252. !d. 
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One possible solution to this dilemma is enforcement of marital contracts by 
courts unless the contracts are unconscionable. 253 Such a rule would alter the 
level of scrutiny U.S. courts give to marital contracts and permit invalidation of 
only the most extreme marital contracts.254 However, this proposal would not 
solve the difficulty of the widespread misuse of judicial discretion. Any workable 
solution must attempt to change the widespread judicial attitude that the 
judiciary has the right to determine the validity of marital contracts in deroga-
tion of the rights of the spouses. 
A. Civil Law Alternative Approach to Enforcement of Marital Contracts 
Civil law jurisdictions, such as France and Quebec,255 present an alternative 
approach to the use of marital contracts. Unlike the common law systems of the 
United States256 and Great Britain, which impose systems of separate property 
on couples,257 the systems of France and Quebec encourage couples to deter-
mine, before marriage, how their property will be owned after marriage.258 
French and Quebec couples can pick their own "matrimonial regime," which will 
govern property rights after marriage.259 The regime chosen by a couple deter-
mines the division of marital property upon dissolution, whether by divorce or 
by the death of one spouse. 260 Thus, couples from France and Quebec may 
determine to a great extent the economic consequences of divorce, in advance of 
the marriage. 261 
1. Legal Regimes Governing Marital Property 
The systems of France and Quebec allow significant contractual freedom 262 by 
permitting prospective spouses to choose their desired marital property system 
253. Clark, Antenuptial Cantracts, supra note 21, at 151 n.50. 
254.Id. 
255. Quebec, Canada, is the single civil law province in common law Canada. One author refers to 
Canada as "bi-systemic," but with little interaction between the two systems. Brierley, Husband and Wife 
in the Law of QyRbec: A 1970 Conspectus, in STUDIES IN CANADIAN FAMILY LAw 795, 796 (D. Mendes da 
Costa ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Brierley]. Quebec models itself on the French system. Id. at 796. 
256. Only the states of Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and 
Washington have adopted the community property approach. GLENDON, STATE, LAw AND FAMILY,supra 
note 83, at 147. 
257. Interspousal Relations, supra note 36, at 156-59. 
258. France: C. CIV. art. 1387; Interspousal Relations, supra note 36, at 149; F. LAwSON, A. ANTON & 
L. BROWN, AMOS AND WALTON'S 1NTROOUCTIONTO FRENCH LAw 253 (1967) [hereinafter cited as AMOS AND 
WALTON'S]' Quebec: C. CIV. art. 1260; Brierley, supra note 255, at 819; Freedman, The Juridical Capacity 
of The Married Woman In (!}lebec: In Relatian to Partnership of Acquests and Recent Amendments to the Civil 
Code, 21 MCGILL L.J. 518, 522 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Freedman]. 
259. France: C. CIV., Title V. Contract of Marriage and Matrimonial Regimes; Interspousal Relations, 
supra note 36, at 149; AMOS AND WALTON's,supra note 258, at 253. Quebec: C. CIV. art. 1260; Brierley, 
supra note 255, at 819; Freedman, supra note 258, at 522. 
260. France: C. CIV. art. 1441; AMOS AND WALTON'S, supra note 258, at 266. Quebec: Brierley, supra 
note 255, at 839. 
261. GLENDON, STATE, LAw AND FAMILY, supra note 83, at 170. 
262. Interspousal Relations, supra note 36, at 149-53; AMOS AND WALTON'S, supra note 258, at 269. 
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through a marriage contract prepared before marriage.263 The Civil Codes of 
both countries provide several alternative regimes with attendant rules for the 
disposition of marital property.264 These alternatives are a legislative response to 
the differing needs throughout the population. 265 lfthe couple does not choose 
an alternative regime, both France and Quebec impose a "legal regime" which 
will operate automatically.266 The legal regime will operate on the spouses only if 
the spouses fail to choose an alternative regime through contract.267 Further-
more, the Civil Codes of both France and Quebec allow the creation of individual 
matrimonial regimes beyond those listed in the Civil Codes. 268 The limitations on 
these individualized regimes are basically only those of law and morals.269 
263. France: C. CIV. arts. 1387, 1395; AMos AND WALTON'S, supra note 258, at 269. Quebec: C. CIV. 
art. 1260; Brierley, supra note 255, at 819. 
264. France: C. CIV. arts. 1497-1525, Regime of Community of Moveables and Acquests (all of the 
assets of the spouses fall into community property, with the exception of immoveables owned before 
marriage or later received through succession or gift); C. CIV. art. 1526, Regime of Universal Commu-
nity, (all property is community property); C. CIV. arts. 1536-1568, Regime of Separate Property (each 
spouse keeps all own property separate, while each contributes to household expenses); C. CIV. arts. 
1569-1581, Regime of Participation in Acquests, (basic separation of property which, at dissolution, 
terminates in a community). 
Quebec: C. CIV. arts. 1268-1425, Community of Moveables and Acquests (property owned before 
marriage and received through succession is separate, while all property earned or received during 
marriage is community property, including fruits and revenues from separate property); C. CIV. arts. 
1436-1450, Separation of Property (each spouse keeps all own property separate, while each contrib-
utes to household expenses). 
265. InterspfYUSal Relntions, supra note 36, at 148. 
266. France: C. CIV. arts. 1387 and 1400; Quebec: C. CIV. art. 1260. 
267. France: InterspfYUSal Relntions, supra note 36, at 149. The authors note that the French legal 
regime is "stop gap" law, to be applied only if the parties have not provided for their own law. Id. 
Quebec: Brierley,supra note 255, at 819. In fact, marital contracts to choose alternative regimes are very 
popular in Quebec. MCLEOD & BAKER, supra note 39, at 27-28. They note "a sizeable percentage of the 
population" contracts out of the legal regime. Id. Fifty-three and three tenths percent of couples 
contracted out of the legal regime between July I, 1970 and Dec. 31, 1973. Jacobson, Recent Proposals for 
the Reform of Family Property Law, 21 MCGILL L.J. 557, 576 (1975). Seventy percent of couples contracted 
out prior to July I, 1970. Report of the General Council of the Bar of Qy,ebec, 27 REVUE DU BARREAU 62 
(1967). Brierley notes that most of these contracts choose separation of property, especially among the 
more wealthy. Brierley, supra note 255, at 826-28. Marital contracts are less popular in France. AMos 
AND WALTON'S, supra note 258, at 272. The authors estimate that only 20% of French couples execute 
marriage contracts, which is consistent with tradition. Id. 
268. France: C. CIV. art. 1387; InterspousalRflntions, supra note 36, at 149; AMos AND WALTON'S,supra 
note 258, at 269. Quebec: C. CIV. art. 1260; MCLEOD & BAKER, supra note 39, at 28 n.217. They note 
couples in Quebec may contract "virtually any arrangement they please." Id. 
269. France: C. CIV. art. 1387 (contracts cannot be contrary to morality or the Civil Code); C. CIV. art. 
1388 ("spouses may derogate neither from the duties nor from the rights which result to them from the 
marriage, nor from the rules for parental authority, legal administration and guardianship"); C. CIV. 
art. 1389 (spouses may not change the legal order of succession). See Interspousal Relntions, supra note 
36, at 149-50. Quebec: C. elV. art. 1258 (contracts cannot be contary to good morals or any law); C. 
CIV. art. 1259 (spouses cannot derogate from the rights conferred upon spouses by "Of the Obligations 
Arising from Marriage," "Of Parental Authority," or "Of Minority, Tutorship and Emancipation"). 
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While the terms describing the legal regimes in France and Quebec differ,270 
the respective systems are similar in practice. Community property is the marital 
property which courts will divide between the spouses upon marriage dissolu-
tion.271 Separate property is individually owned property which courts cannot 
divide between the spouses at any time.272 The French legal regime is a "com-
munity of after acquired property."273 The community property consists of 
profits from the spouses' work and savings during marriage as well as from the 
profits of their own separate property.274 Each spouse controls his or her own 
separate property, while the husband controls the community property.275 How-
ever, the husband must obtain the wife's consent for most important transactions 
affecting the community property.276 
The Quebec legal regime of "partnership of acquests"277 similarly combines 
the equality and independence of separation of property with the sharing re-
quirement of community property.278 Community property consists of the earn-
ings, savings or revenues accumulated during marriage by the spouses (the 
acquests).279 Separate property consists of all other property, including gifts 
received after marriage.28o Unlike in the French legal regime, in Quebec both 
spouses control the community property.281 Independent control over the com-
munity property by each spouse is restricted only by the requirement that both 
spouses agree on gratuitous dispositions of the community property.282 
2. Procedural Requirements for Marriage Contracts 
Both France and Quebec require notaries to execute all marriage contracts.283 
The civil law notary is significantly different from the common law notary.284 
270. France: GLENDON, STATE, LAw AND FAMILY, supra note 83, at 144 (community reduced to 
acquests); AMos AND WALTON'S, supra note 258, at 379 (community of acquisitions); Hahlo, supra note 
225, at 469 (community of after acquired property). Quebec: C. elv. art. 1266c (partnership of 
acquests); see Hahlo, supra note 225, at 470. 
271. AMos AND WALTON'S, supra note 258, at 380-82; Brierley, supra note 255, at 821-26. 
272. AMos AND WALTON'S, supra note 258, at 380-84; Brierley, supra note 255, at 826-30. 
273. Hahlo, supra note 225, at 469. 
274. C. elY. art. 1401. 
275. C. elY. arts. 1421-1440; GLENDON, STATE, LAw AND FAMILY, supra note 83, at 145; AMos AND 
WALTON'S, supra note 258, at 382; Hahlo, supra note 225, at 469. 
276. GLENDON, STATE, LAw AND FAMILY,supra note 83, at 145; AMOS AND WALTON's,supra note 258, 
at 382. 
277. C. elY. art. I 266c. 
278. Brierley, supra note 255, at 835. Brierley notes that the new legal regime combines the funda-
mental features of the community and separate property systems. ld. 
279. C. elY. art. 1266d; Brierley, supra note 255, at 837-38; Freedman, supra note 258, at 530-31. 
280. C. elv. art. 1266e; Brierley, supra note 255, at 838; Freedman, supra note 258, at 531. 
281. C. elY. art. 12660. See Freedman,supra note 258, regarding the juridical equality of women in 
Quebec. 
282. C. elv. art. 12660; Brierley, supra note 255, at 838-39; Freedman, supra note 258, at 530. 
283. France: C. elv. art. 1394; Inter spousal Relations, supra note 36, at 149; AMOS AND WALTON's,supra 
note 258, at 271. Quebec: C. elY. art. 1264. 
284. Merryman, The Civil Law TraditWn, in COMPARATIVE LAw: WESTERN EUROPEAN AND LATIN 
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The civil law notary is an important person in the legal process in that he drafts 
important legal instruments,285 authenticates instruments286 and keeps impor-
tant records.287 The notary is a career professional, who must pass a professional 
examination before certification.288 He is often a trusted family advisor,289 who 
exercises considerable influence over his client's business. 29o 
For a valid marital contract, couples must comply with clearly stated pro-
cedural requirements. 291 The notary must keep the contract on record.292 Fur-
ther, the notary must register the marriage certificate, and must note the con-
tract on the face of the marriage certificate. 293 French law requires further 
registration if one of the spouses is a merchant. 294 If the parties fail to give the 
contr;,tct the proper publicity,295 the contract may be invalid as to third parties, 
unless those third parties have actual knowledge of the contract's existence and 
terms.296 
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 456 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Merryman]. Indeed, Merryman observes 
only a superficial similarity between the civil law notary and the notary public in common law countries. 
Id. See generally, Herzog, Civil Procedure in France, in COMPARATIVE LAw: WESTERK EUROPEAN AND LATIN 
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 509-13 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Herzog] for duties of a French notary. 
285. Merryman, supra note 284, at 456-57. These instruments include wills, corporate charters, 
conveyances and contracts. Id. Herzog, supra note 284, at 509. 
286. Merryman, supra note 284, at 457. Such an authenticated instrument has special evidentiary 
effect and can only be attacked in a special proceeding. Id.,' Herzog, supra note 284, at 5lO. 
287. Merryman, supra note 284, at 457. The notary must keep copies of the original of every 
instrument he executes. Id. See note 286 supra. 
288. Herzog, supra note 284, a~ 509-10. Herzog notes that most French notaries have a law degree 
and fulfill clerkships of four to six years. Id. See Merryman, supra note 284, at 457. See generally Chapter 
N-2, "Notarial Act," QUE. REv. STAT. (1977), for a general discussion of a notary's duties in Quebec. 
289. Herzog, supra note 284, at 513. Herzog notes: "The very nature of the instruments for which 
[the notary's] assistance is required, such as ant!'-nuptial agreements, gifts, authentic testaments, and real 
estate transactions, brings him in close contact with family problems." Id. 
290. AMos AND WALTON'S,supra note 258, at 273. In practice, notaries often rely on popular standard 
forms, which they adapt as needed. /d. Brierley, supra note 255, at 828. Brierley notes the influence of 
notaries and the high incidence of printed marriage forms. Id. 
291. Quebec law requires that a notary execute the marriage contract and keep it on record. C. CIV. 
art. 1264. Further, the central register of matrimonial regimes must contain a notice of the contract. C. 
CIV. art. l266b. This notice must contain: names of spouses, birth dates, names of their parents, date of 
the contract, name and address of the notary. C. CIV. art. 1266b. For discussion of the duties of the 
notary in Quebec, see Chapter N-2, "Notarial Act," QUE. REv. STAT. (1977). 
292. C. CIV. art. 1394; Interspousal Relations, supra note 36, at 162; AMOS AND WALTm-;'S, supra note 
258, at 272. 
293. C. CIV. art. 1394; Interspousal Relations, supra note 36, at 162; AMOS AND WALTON'S, supra note 
258, at 272. 
294. C. CIV. art. 1394; Interspousal Relations, supra note 36, at 162; AMOS ANn WALTON'S, supra note 
258, at 272. 
295. See notes 292-94 and accompanying text supra. 
296. France: C. CIV. arts. 1394, 1396; lnterspousal Relations, supra note 36, at 163. Such procedures are 
meant to give notice to a third party, who may consider giving credit to one of the spouses and should 
know of the state of each spouse's property. AMOS AND WALTON'S, supra note 258, at 272. Quebec: C. 
CIV. art. 1266b. 
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3. Enforcement of Marriage Contracts 
The courts in France and Quebec enforce marriage contracts.297 The Civil 
Code of each jurisdiction provides for the effect of contracts.29B Article 1134 of 
the French Civil Code provides: "Agreements legally made take the place of law 
for those who make them."299 Similarly, the Quebec Civil Code provides: con-
tracts "can be set aside only by the mutual consent of the parties, or for causes 
established by law."30o 
The strictness of the enforcement of contracts is further illustrated by the 
formalities required to modify a marriage contract. To modify their contract, 
spouses must apply to the court.301 The court will then allow the change only ifit 
rules that the changes are in the best interests of the family.302 The judicially 
obtained approval of a change in a marriage contract ("homologation")303 re-
quires prior publicity by the couple so that the change does not adversely affect a 
third party.304 In addition, a notary must execute the new agreement, and the 
original contract must note all the changes. 305 
297. France: C. CIV. art. 1134. Quebec: C. CIV. art. 1022. 
298. France: C. CIV. arts. 1134-1135. Quebec: C. CIV. arts. 1022-1027. 
299. C. CIV. art. 1134. 
300. C. CIV. art. 1022. 
30 I. France: C. CIV. art. 1397; Interspousal Rewtwns, supra note 36, at 161; AMos AND WALTON'S,supra 
note 258, at 388. Quebec: C. CIV. arts. 1265, 1266, and 1266a; Brierley, surpra note 255, at 832. 
302. France: C. CIV. art. 1397;1nterspousal Rewtwns, supra note 36, at 161; AMos AND WALTON'S,supra 
note 258, at 388. Quebec: C. CIV. arts. 1265, 1266, and 1266a; Brierley, supra note 255, at 832. 
present matrimonial regime must have applied for two years before homologation is possible. C. CIV. 
art. 1397; Interspousal Relations, supra note 36, at 161; AMOS AND WALTON'S, supra note 258, at 388. In 
Quebec, the modification must also not prejudice the rights of creditors. C. CIV. art. 1265; Brierley, 
supra note 255, at 832. 
303. France: Interspousal Rewtions, supra note 36, at 163. Quebec: C. CIV. art. 1266; Brierley, supra 
note 255, at 832. 
304. France: C. CIV. art. 1397; Interspousal Rewtions, supra note 36, at 163. This publicity required by 
the Civil Code is as follows: 
Both the petition requesting approval of a change of regime and the judgment approving the 
new agreement of the spouses must be published in a newspaper appearing in the jurisdiction 
of the court. In addition, the decision must be reported to the municipality where the marriage 
took place, so it can be mentioned on the margin of the marriage certificate ... If one of the 
spouses is in commerce, the judgment approving the notarial act or modifying the matrimonial 
regime must be mentioned on the commercial register, on pain of being held invalid as to third 
parties in commercial matters. 
Interspousal Rewtwns, supra note 36, at 163; C. CIV. art. 1397. Quebec: C. CIV. arts. 1266, 1266a, 1266b; 
Brierley, supra note 255, at 832. Quebec requires additional publicity, which Brierley notes is "rigor-
ous." Brierley, supra note 255, at 832. He elaborates: 
After notice to all creditors and parties to the original contract, the consorts' new agreement in 
notarial form must be presented for judicial "homologation" (i.e., approval contained in a 
judgment), which is then recorded with the notary who is the depositary of the contract. The 
change in the regime is only effective in regard to third persons upon registration of a further 
notice in the central registry of matrimonial regimes. 
Id. C. CIV. arts. 1266, 1266a, 1266b. 
305. France: C. CIV. art. 1397; Interspousal Rewtwns, supra note 36, at 163. Quebec: C. CIV. arts. 1266, 
1266a. 
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B. The Civil Law Approach Provides a Possible Solulion for the United States in 
Enforcing Marital Contracts 
505 
With respect to the failure of courts in the United States to enforce marital 
contracts, U.S. courts may borrow a possible solution from the civil law systems. 
After executing their marital contract, a couple could execute an attestation 
document similar to a "self-proving" wil1.306 The civil law systems enforce mar-
riage contracts as written, after compliance with specificprocedures. The United 
States could attem pt to achieve the certainty and stability of the civil law marriage 
contracts, without a loss of fairness, by a self-proving will type of procedure. 307 
As illustrated by the expansive judicial discretion exercised by the courts, U.S. 
courts are unwilling to allow any vestige of unfairness in marital contracts.30B 
The proposed procedure would give the same protection as judges have desired 
to provide, but through legislative decision, and not through individual fiat. In 
this way, the subjectivity of the individual judges would not pervade the system. 
Couples could be confident that their contracts would be enforced. 
The application of the attestation procedure would be simple. As for a self-
proving will, the couples would swear that they understood their rights and 
obligations under the marriage contract. 309 This attestation would help to elimi-
nate most of the litigation regarding proper disclosure, execution and acknowl-
edgment of the content of marital contracts. 310 The procedure would help to 
establish the prima facie validity of the contract. The courts could then enforce 
the contracts without the subsequent substitution of judicial judgment. Absent 
proof of fraud, the attestation procedure would be dispositive of the voluntari-
ness and fairness of the contract. 
As noted earlier in the discussion, wills are analogous in character to marital 
contracts. 311 Thus, procedure regarding wills should adapt well in the marital 
contract area. In fact, the drafters of the Uniform Probate Code312 borrowed the 
procedure for a self-proving will from a civil law system. 313 Such an appropria-
tion could easily extend to include marital contracts. Many jurisdictions already 
have adopted the mechanism for self-proving wills and easily could exploit this 
mechanism for marital contracts. 314 Thus. a relatively minor expansion could 
provide effective results. 
306. M. Glendon, Letter to William P. Cantwell, Reporter of the Drafting Committee for the 
Uniform Marital Property Act of the Uniform Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws 
(Oct. 6, 1981). 
307. Id. See Uniform Probate Code § 2-504 (1969). 
308. See § lI.B & C, supra. 
309. See Uniform Probate Code § 2-504 (1969). 
310. RHEINSTEIN & GLENDON, supra note 193, at 198-99. 
311. See notes 193-96 and accompanying text supra. 
312. Uniform Probate Code § 2-504. 
313. RHEINSTEIN & GLENDON, supra note 193, at 198-99. 
314. As of 1982, the Uniform Probate Code has been adopted by the following states: Alaska, 
Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Neb-
raska, New Mexico, North Dakota and Utah. UNIFORM PROBATE CODE, 8 U.L.A. 114 (Supp. 1982). 
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The use of a disinterested third party, similar to the civil law notary, would also 
help to ensure that both parties were entering into the contract freely, intelli-
gently and with full disclosure of assets. 315 Under this system, the third party 
would inform the couple of their rights under the law. Per ha ps jurisdictions 
could adapt an aspect of the U.S. adversary process to perform a notarial 
function. For example, courts could impose a mandatory requirement of a 
lawyer for each party, or one disinterested lawyer for both parties, who could 
help to achieve the same goals of disclosure and free, knowing execution. 
These procedures would help to reestablish the utility of marital contracts by 
facilitating individual autonomy to the benefit of parties and the courts. Courts 
could then discontinue their refusal to enforce many marital contracts on ques-
tionable grounds. Thus, contractual freedom would become a reality. Such 
procedural devices may also eliminate other problems which exist under the 
present U.S. system. For example, courts sometimes have difficulty reconstruct-
ing the circumstances which existed at the time the couple made the contract.316 
Required attestation and use of a third party to advise a couple would help to 
diminish litigation over marital contracts. Compliance by couples with both 
procedures would help to determine the validity of the contract without litiga-
tion. Most important, however, the proposed system would give some necessary 
stability to this area of the law.317 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Comment has examined the widespread assumption in the United States 
that marital contracts will be enforced as other contracts, and found that it rests 
on a tenuous foundation. In fact, judges routinely invalidate marital contracts in 
the exercise of their broad discretion. 
Many requirements exist for valid marital contracts in the United States, 
including fairness, full disclosure, duty to inform or explain, independent coun-
sel or advice, and freedom from duress. Noncompliance with anyone of these 
requirements can serve to invalidate a marital contract. In addition, presump-
tions of concealment and duress militate against a finding of validity. Many of 
these marital contract requirements offer much latitude for judicial discretion. 
Determinations of fairness and overreaching are subjective and provide courts 
with the opportunity to substitute their own ideas of fairness for the contractu-
ally stated intent of the parties. With so many grounds upon which to challenge 
marital contracts, courts often invalidate these contracts. 
315. See note 306 supra. 
316. Courts sometimes have difficulty in determining circumstances at the time of making the 
contract. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 354 S.W.2d 532 (Mo. Ct. App. 1962). Further, mortmain or dead 
man's statutes may make the determination even more difficult. See, e.g., In re Estate of Strickland, 181 
Neb. 478, 149 N.W.2d 344 (1967). 
317. WEITZMAN, supra note 76, at 356. 
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Similarly, British courts have broad discretion regarding the vanatIOn of 
marriage settlements, whether upon divorce or death. In Great Britain, as well as 
the United States, courts may substitute their judgment for the contractually 
stated intent of the parties. However, in Great Britain, the courts' discretionary 
power to vary settlements is clearly stated in the law, and is the result of a 
democratic decision by the legislative branch of government. The British public 
is not deceived, and the British courts have not delegated this broad power to 
themselves as have the U.S. courts. 
In contrast, courts in civil law jurisdictions enforce marriage contracts. 
Spouses in the civil law jurisdictions of France and Quebec have wide contractual 
freedom in the formation of marriage contracts. Once a couple fulfills the 
procedural requirements, including the use of a notary to counsel parties and to 
ensure the proper execution of the contract, the couple may have confidence 
that courts will enforce their marriage contract. 
The United States could adopt procedures analogous to those of the self-
proving will to combat the courts' reluctance to enforce marital contracts. Such 
an attestation procedure could use the existing mechanism for self-proving wills, 
and would help to establish the prima facie validity of a marital contract. Fur-
ther, an independent third party, or even a lawyer for each party, could help to 
ensure disclosure between the parties and free and knowing assent to the 
contract. By adhering to these specific procedures, couples would preclude the 
need and justification for judges to exercise judicial discretion when construing 
marital contracts. 
Susan Vogt Brown 
